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Preface
The Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations (the
Dunlop Commission) met for one of its regional hearings in East Lansing,
Michigan on the campus of Michigan State University on October 13, 1993.
The interaction and discussion between the commissioners and the presenters
formed the original inspiration and rationale for this volume. The breadth of
experience presented and the quality of dialogue convinced the authors that
something more needed to be done regarding the hearings, beyond the final
report that the Commission was charged to deliver.
Since commissions of this type have been rare in U.S. history, the Dunlop
Commission provided a unique opportunity for today©s analysts and practitio
ners to take stock of the current practice of labor-management relations. We
decided to start the important process, which other contemporary researchers
and future historians might follow, of using the hearing testimony as an impor
tant primary document for research and analysis. This is of key importance,
since the testimony covered a broader range of experiences, and with richer
detail and deeper exploration, than the Commission was able to give proper
attention in its report. (In fact, this volume has no relation to the Commission
report and should be viewed as distinct from it.)
In the East Lansing hearings, for example, the Commissioners and the
audience were not only treated to some of the examples of cooperative and
adversarial labor relations chronicled in this book, but also heard presentations
on grievance mediation, disability management, workplace diversity, employment-at-will, and other important workplace issues as well. Though we could
not and did not cover all the presentations in this volume (we did read every
one of them!), we invite other scholars and practitioners to go to the source
and see for themselves the wealth of material embedded in the Commission
testimony.
We would like to thank all of those connected to the East Lansing hearings
who piqued our interest enough to initiate this project, including Douglas
Fraser, Thomas Kochan, and Paula Voos, the Commissioners who came to
East Lansing to hear testimony, and M. Peter McPherson, president of Michi
gan State University and Randall Eberts, executive director of W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research, who represented the sponsoring organiza
tions. The East Lansing hearings would not have been possible without the
following corporations, unions, and individuals who gave testimony: Miller
Brewing and United Autoworkers Local 2308, Trenton, Ohio; Herman Miller
Company; Donnelly Corporation; Johnson Controls and the International

Association of Machinists Lodge 66, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Mead Paper and
United Paperworkers International Union Local 21, Escanaba, Michigan; Dow
Chemical; International Business Machines; General Motors; Service
Employees International Union, District 1199, Columbus, Ohio; United Food
and Commercial Workers Local 951, Grand Rapids, Michigan; Graphic Com
munications International Union Local 577M, West Allis, Wisconsin; Amal
gamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Findlay, Ohio; the United
Autoworkers International Union; Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt and Hewlett;
Professor Rochelle Habeck; and Professor Theodore St. Antoine.
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CHAPTER

Introduction and Overview
The past two decades of industrial relations experience have had the
cumulative effect of a widespread realization that discussion and
debate over the nation©s labor laws and their administration are needed.
Concerns have been growing about the costs to society of labor con
flict, and questions have been raised as to whether there is a role for
labor legislation in encouraging labor-management cooperation in
order to enhance the global competitiveness of U.S. firms.
In response to this accumulation of concerns, the Secretaries of
Commerce and Labor in 1993 created the Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, often referred to as the Dunlop Com
mission, as it was chaired by former U.S. Secretary of Labor John
Dunlop. The task of the Commission was to investigate the current
state of worker-management relations and labor law and make recom
mendations concerning changes that may be needed to improve pro
ductivity through increased worker-management cooperation and
employee participation in the workplace.
A widely diverse set of experiences was presented as public testi
mony before the Commission in 1994. Representatives of labor, man
agement, government, academia, and the general public presented a
picture of considerable variation in current labor relations practice. The
whole of this testimony, however, pointed to the need for a continued
public discourse about labor law, and quite possibly, the need for fun
damental change. Labor law, as it has been developed since the Wagner
Act in 1935, has always been based on the concept of the parties
individual workers, unions, and management making choices. The
Dunlop Commission hearings pointed up a new range of choices being
explored by workers and managers and the frustration of some of the
traditional choices originally designed into the law.
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We believe that the Dunlop Commission hearings recorded the dom
inant issues in industrial relations today, and that the testimony offers a
unique opportunity to understand the state of labor-management rela
tions in the United States in the 1990s. The purpose of this book is to
capture the essence of the hearings and make it accessible to the indus
trial relations community, to policy makers, and to the general public.

Historical Background
Union membership in the United States has shown great historical
variation. Membership rose fairly steadily between 1897 and 1904, as
the internal structure of the movement attained some stability with the
advent of the American Federation of Labor. Strong business condi
tions also led to an increase in the power of union membership. Even
tually, unionization reached a high of about 12 percent of the
nonagricultural labor force in 1904, and remained at about 11 percent
through 1916. World War I and its aftermath increased the rate to about
19 percent by 1921. Boom business conditions brought about by the
war and government policy to encourage labor peace had much to do
with the success of unions during this period (Block and Premack
1983; Troy 1965).
The 1920s were a decade of decline for unions due to the recession
of 1920-1923, employer welfare capitalism in the middle 1920s, post
war government pressure on left-wing activities emanating from the
Russian Revolution, and the onset of the depression. Unionization
reached a post-World War I low point of 10.7 percent in 1930. The
early New Deal legislation that provided some support for unionization
was associated with a slight increase in the rate of unionization, to
about 13.3 percent in 1935 (Block and Premack 1983; Troy 1965).
The passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 was clearly associated with
a significant increase in unionization. Between 1935 and 1941, the
unionization rate increased 10 points, to 23 percent of the labor force.
Another significant increase was associated with World War II. By the
end of the war, unionization had increased to about 30 percent of the
labor force. During the war, the encouragement to unionization pro
vided by the Wagner Act was augmented by the pro-collective bargain-
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ing policies of the War Labor Board, designed to avoid strikes that
would disrupt the war effort (Troy 1965; "Termination Report of the
National War Labor Board" 1947; Taylor 1948; Witte 1946).
Small increases in unionization continued after the war through the
early 1950s. The rate of unionization peaked at approximately 35 per
cent in 1955. Since then, unionization has steadily declined. In 1995,
approximately 16.5 percent of the U.S. labor force was represented by
unions. A somewhat deeper examination shows that this rate is propped
up by the high rate of unionization (43.5 percent) in the public sector.
Private sector unionization was at about 11.4 percent, comparable to
the level of unionization in the mid-1920s, when there was no legisla
tion in the United States protecting workers© rights to organize. The
decline in unionization from 1955-1994 is unprecedented in the United
States, and shows no signs of abating (Troy 1965; Meltz 1990; Chaison
and Rose 1991; Daily Labor Report No. 28, 1992, pp. B-l to B 5; U.S.
Department of Labor 1996).
Indeed, the United States ranked 22 out of 24 OECD countries in the
rate of unionization in 1988, with a unionization rate of 16.8 percent.
Only Spain, at 16 percent, and France at 12.8 percent ranked below the
United States in the OECD study. By contrast, major U.S. competitors
such as Canada, Germany, and Japan had unionization rates of 34.6
percent, 33.8 percent, and 26.8 percent, respectively (OECD 1991).
As a result of this long-term decline in unionization, the United
States is in one of those critical periods in its history when ferment in
the industrial relations community suggests that it may be time to reexamine industrial relations institutions. The first such critical period was
1933-47. During this fifteen-year period, an economic depression and
widespread strike activity resulted in the passage of the National Labor
Relations (Wagner) Act, which was designed to create a system for
peacefully determining whether employees wished to be represented
by a union and to raise the standard of living of workers by allowing
them to bargain collectively with their employer.
During that period, labor and management, with the intervention of
the World War II War Labor Board, established many of the industrial
relations mechanism and principles that are still in use. However,
employers continued to advocate for changes in the Wagner Act that
they contended would bring balance into the industrial relations sys
tem. This pressure, in combination with a rash of strikes in 1946,
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resulted in the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 over the veto of
President Harry Truman.
The thirty-year period following Taft-Hartley was one of overall sta
bility in industrial relations. By the late 1940s, collective bargaining
was well-established, especially in the manufacturing and transporta
tion industries. Moreover, these industries exhibited remarkable eco
nomic prosperity. With little foreign competition, manufacturing
continued to generate large profits and high standards of living for
workers. Regulation generally prevented the entry of nonunion com
petitors and permitted price stability in transportation, a situation that
resulted in high wages for unionized workers and high profits for
employers.
As noted, however, hidden under this stability were some trends that
suggested the industrial relations system was moving towards a crisis.
Private sector unionization rates began a steady decline from a high of
roughly 35 percent in the mid 1950s. Interpretations of the National
Labor Relations Act by the courts and the National Labor Relations
Board were making it increasingly difficult for unions to organize (see
chapter 2). By the late 1970s, an increasingly competitive economic
environment was causing management to question the established
practices within industrial relations. While some firms responded to
changes in the competitive environment by cooperating with unions,
others engaged in conflict, attempting to eliminate unions representing
their employees.
Since the late 1970s, unions have experienced increasing difficul
ties within the industrial relations system. Although the economic envi
ronment has no doubt been responsible for part of the decline in the
fortunes of unions, it has become increasingly clear, first to unionists
and then to many neutral observers, that the nation©s labor law is a
major contributing factor. While private sector industrial relations in
the United States is affected by many phenomena, labor law is likely
the factor that affects it most directly. The law applies to all of the par
ties, whereas the effect of economic conditions can vary from firm to
firm. In addition, the law contains compulsion once one party
invokes its procedures, the other party must go along. Third, the law is
very public and open to all. Legal decisions are reported, and attorneys
are very aware of them. Thus, these decisions can be used to argue for
or against future conduct in labor relations.
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Just as employers became concerned about the state of industrial
relations in the late 1930s and early 1940s concerns that were
reflected in the Taft-Hartley Act unions have also developed legisla
tive initiatives to address their concerns.
In 1976-77, the AFL-CIO spearheaded an unsuccessful campaign
for labor law reform. The Labor Law Reform Act of 1977 failed to sur
vive a filibuster in the U. S. Senate in the face of strong business oppo
sition to the legislation©s attempt to speed up the election process and
increase penalties on parties found in violation of labor laws. 1
A second union-supported initiative to change the nation©s labor
laws started in 1989 when legislation was proposed to end the use of
permanent replacement workers during labor disputes. First introduced
as a bar to the use of replacements for the first ten weeks of a strike, the
legislation was reintroduced as a flat ban in 1990. The legislative his
tory on this issue came to an abrupt end in July of 1994 with two failed
cloture votes in the U. S. Senate. Thus, the measure died, although it
had passed the House of Representatives with a wide majority in 1993
and would have been signed by President Clinton (Daily Labor Report,
various issues).
Just as unions had bitterly opposed the Taft-Hartley changes in the
late 1940s, employers opposed the labor law changes of the late 1970s
and early 1980s. The difference, however, is that employers were suc
cessful in their opposition, while unions were unsuccessful.

Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
The Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
was created in March 1993 in response to an accumulation of concerns.
There were growing fears that the nation©s labor laws were neither ade
quately addressing the rights of employees to organize and bargain col
lectively, nor supporting the emerging structures and understandings
being built in both union and nonunion workplaces to advance
employee voice and satisfaction.
The creation of such a commission is a rare event. This is only the
second governmental commission appointed in this century to take a
broad-based look at employment relations in the United States; the
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United States Commission on Industrial Relations was established in
1912 and issued its final report in 1915. In addition, in 1947 the
National Planning Association appointed the Committee on the Causes
of Industrial Peace to undertake case studies of cooperative collective
bargaining relationships. An excerpt from the final reports of each of
these two bodies demonstrates the ongoing nature of many of the com
ments and concerns highlighted in this volume.
Excerpt from the Final Report of the U. S. Commission on Industrial
Relations (1915):
A more serious and fundamental charge is, however, contained in
the allegation by the workers that in spite of the nominal legal
rights which have been established by a century long struggle,
almost insurmountable obstacles are placed in the way of their
using the only means by which economic and political justice can
be secured, namely combined action through voluntary organiza
tion. ...
As a result, therefore, not only of fundamental considerations but
of practical investigations, the results of which are described in
detail hereinafter, it would appear that every means should be used
to extend and strengthen organizations through the entire indus
trial field. Much attention has been devoted to the means by which
this can best be accomplished, and a large number of suggestions
have been received. As a result of careful consideration, it is sug
gested that the commission recommend the following action:
1. Incorporation among the rights guaranteed by the Constitution
of the unlimited right of individuals to form associations, not
for the sake of profit but for the advancement of their individual
and collective interests.
2. Enactment of statues specifically protecting this right and pro
hibiting the discharge of any person because of his membership
in a labor organization.
3. Enactment of a statute providing that action on the part of an
association of individuals not organized for profit shall not be
held to be unlawful where such action would not be unlawful in
the case of an individual.
4. That the Federal Trade Commission be specifically empowered
and directed by Congress, in determining unfair methods of
competition to take into account and specially investigate the
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unfair treatment of labor in all respects, with particular refer
ence to the following points:
(a)Refusal to permit employees to become members of labor
organizations.
(b)Refusal to meet or confer with the authorized representa
tives of employees.
5. That the Department of Labor, through the Secretary of Labor
or any other authorized official, be empowered and directed to
present to the Federal Trade Commission, and to prosecute
before that body all cases of unfair competition arising out of
the treatment of labor which may come to its attention.
6. That such cases, affecting as they do the lives of citizens in the
humblest circumstances, as well as the profits of competitors
and the peace of the community, be directed by Congress to
have precedence over all other cases before the Federal Trade
Commission.2

Excerpt from the Final Report of the Committee on the Causes of
Industrial Peace:
In the Committee©s statements introducing each "Case Study"
some basic causes of industrial peace have been listed. The list has
varied and been expanded as the studies accumulated. It has one
distinguishing characteristic. Each cause on the list refers to atti
tudes and approaches which the parties themselves have con
sciously adopted or helped to achieve. Furthermore, each was
important in explaining the degree of industrial peace found in the
specific case. It is worth repeating the complete list here.
1. There is full acceptance by management of the collective bar
gaining process and of unionism as an institution. The company
considers a strong union an asset to management.
2. The union fully accepts private ownership and operation of the
industry; it recognizes that the welfare of its members depends
upon the successful operation of the business.
3. The union is strong, responsible, and democratic.
4. The company stays out of the union©s internal affairs; it does
not seek to alienate the workers© allegiance to their union.
5. Mutual trust and confidence exist between the parties. There
have been no serious ideological incompatibilities.
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6. Neither party to bargaining has adopted a legalistic approach to
the solution of problems in the relationship.
7. Negotiations are problem-centered more time is spent on dayto-day problems than on defining abstract principles.
8. There is widespread union-management consultation and
highly developed information sharing.
9. Grievances are settled promptly, in the local plant whenever
possible. There is flexibility and informality within the proce
dure.3

Between May 1993 and April 1994, the Commission on the Future
of Worker-Management Relations (the Dunlop Commission) held
eleven national hearings and six regional hearings. The national hear
ings were held in Washington, D.C. The six regional hearings were
held in Louisville, East Lansing (Michigan), Atlanta, San Jose (Cali
fornia), Houston, and Boston. Those testifying included representatives
from all strata of the industrial relations community: corporate CEOs,
international union presidents, corporate human resources officials,
plant managers, first-line supervisors, regional and local union offi
cials, union organizers, and hourly workers, both unionized and non
union. The result was a true cross-section of day-to-day industrial
relations life in the United States that only a governmental body with
the status of a national commission could assemble.
This volume differs from the Commission©s "Fact-Finding Report"
and "Report and Recommendations" in two fundamental ways. First,
although we would hope that this volume will inform the policy debate
on the law of labor-management relations, it is not designed to put
forth detailed policy recommendations, which was the mission of the
Commission.
Second, as in most documents designed to create policy recommen
dations, the Commission in its "Fact-Finding Report" and "Report and
Recommendations" was only able to briefly summarize and highlight
the evidence and testimony that form the basis of its recommendations.
It was our view that the details of this evidence represented a rare win
dow into the variation that was thought to exist in labor-management
relations in the United States. A policy-oriented summary did not do it
justice. The purpose of this volume is to do what the Commission
could not do make the richness of that testimony available in an orga-
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nized, accessible format to the business, labor, and policy communities
in the United States.
This book does not address all possible issues arising under labor
law. Most notably, it does not address unfair and illegal tactics by
unions during organizing drives. No evidence of such tactics was
brought before the Commission. While such actions by unions may
occur, the absence of any strong movement to amend Section 8(b) of
the National Labor Relations Act (the provisions creating union unfair
labor practices), suggests that the current provisions in the NLRA reg
ulating union behavior in organizing campaigns are serving their
intended purpose.
This effort was undertaken with the knowledge of the Commission.
In order to maintain the independence of the authors and of the Com
mission, no member of the Commission had any involvement in the
preparation or review of the manuscript. The book is the sole responsi
bility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, or the Michigan State Uni
versity School of Labor and Industrial Relations.
Chapter 2 of the book will place the subsequent chapters in their
legal, historical, economic, and industrial context, demonstrating that
the essence of the industrial relations system is the protection of
employee choice to be represented by a union, or not to be represented
by a union. Specifically, chapter 2 will discuss how the U.S. industrial
relations system can produce wide variation in employment relations
practices revolving around the matter of employee choice. Chapter 3,
based on the transcripts of the hearings, will focus on innovative
employment relationships in which employers respect employee
choice, both to be represented by a union and to choose to remain non
union. Chapter 4, also based on the transcripts, discusses some exam
ples of how the law permits employers to interfere with and infringe
upon employee choice. Chapter 5 will discuss some conclusions and
policy implications.
NOTES
1. The story of the Labor Law Reform Act of 1977-78 is chronicled in issues of the Daily
Labor Report for that time period.
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2. Final Report of and Testimony Submitted to Congress by the Commission on Industrial
Relations Created by the Act of August 23, 1912, Vol. I, Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 1915, especially pp. 61, 67-68.
3. Causes of Industrial Peace Under Collective Bargaining, Clinton S. Golden and Virginia D.
Parker, eds., New York: Harper & Bros., 1955, p. 47.

CHAPTER ^____________________________

Labor and Industrial Relations Law
and Practice in the United States
Overview of Labor and Industrial Relations Law
The basic law covering union-management relations in the United
States is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), first enacted in
1935. Sweeping amendments were adopted in 1947, with additional
amendments enacted in 1959 and 1974. The latter amendments
brought private, nonprofit health care institutions under the coverage of
the NLRA. Although one can summarize some of the basic principles
of the NLRA fairly quickly, an important aspect of this chapter is the
history of the law and how it evolved.©
The National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935

The NLRA (Wagner Act) was passed in 1935, on the heels of wide
spread strike activity that occurred in 1934. The ostensible reasons for
passage of the NLRA, as found in the preamble to the law, were to
avoid the disruption of commerce caused by strikes over the recogni
tion of unions and to permit employees to exercise their collective bar
gaining power to raise living standards (Bernstein 1969, ch. 4-7;
Keyserling 1945, pp. 5-33). Thus, Section 1, under "Findings and Poli
cies" stated:
The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and
the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bar
gaining led to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest,
which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or
obstructing commerce....
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The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do
not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of con
tract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other
forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects
the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business
depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power
of wage earnings in industry and by preventing the stabilization of
competitive wage rates and working conditions within and
between industries.

Later in the statute, in Section 7, the rights of employees to engage
in collective activity were made explicit:
(e)mployees shall have the right to self-organization to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activ
ities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.

As such, the purpose of the NLRA was to provide a peaceful means
for determining whether a group of employees chose to be represented
for collective bargaining purposes by a labor organization. To effectu
ate the employee choice process for unionization and to guarantee
employees their Section 7 rights, the NLRA created employer unfair
labor practices, making unlawful some employer practices that were
thought to prevent employees from exercising their rights. Declared
unlawful were such specific practices as discriminating against or dis
charging an employee for exercising rights given by the NLRA, giving
testimony or filing a charge under the NLRA, and dominating or inter
fering with the formation of a labor organization. The NLRA also
established a general prohibition, making it an unfair labor practice for
employers to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce" employees in the
exercise of their rights. In including this latter unfair labor practice,
Congress acknowledged that it could not anticipate all the various
ways in which employers could interfere with the rights of employees.
The Wagner Act also made it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the union chosen by its
employees. Thus, the Wagner Act provided the employees the opportu
nity to realize the fruits of their choice by imposing an obligation on
the employer to bargain with the union, if chosen.
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The rights under the Act would be worth little if they could not be
enforced. To that end, the Wagner Act also created a three-member
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a specialized administrative
agency, the sole function of which was to administer the NLRA. As the
wording in the NLRA was purposefully broad, the NLRB, like other
administrative agencies to be created, would actually legislate, by mak
ing substantive legal decisions regarding what employers were permit
ted, and were not permitted, to do. Board members were appointed by
the president and confirmed by the Senate, and served staggered, fiveyear terms. Thus, although the Board was supposedly neutral in mat
ters of labor relations, its political composition would change with the
shifting political consensus (Bernstein 1969, p. 326).
The Board had (and continues to have) two major tasks; to deter
mine whether an "appropriate unit" of employees wished to be repre
sented by a union (the "representation" function), and to prevent unfair
labor practices (the "enforcement" function). The representation issue
contains two questions: is the unit (group of employees) for which the
union is seeking representation appropriate, and if so do those employ
ees wish to be represented by a union? For a unit to be appropriate, the
Board examined whether there were sufficient common work interests
among a group of employees such that they could form a cohesive bar
gaining unit. Such factors as similar skills, similar wage rates, similar
job duties, comparable supervision, and geographic proximity are con
sidered in these determinations.2
In determining whether a unit of employees wished to be repre
sented by a union, the Board initially matched the signatures on union
authorization cards with employer payroll records. If a majority of the
employees had signed authorization cards, the Board would certify the
union as the employees© bargaining representative. By the mid-1940s,
however, the Board had developed the representation election as an
alternative to card checks.3
In addition to its representation role, the Board was empowered to
investigate and prevent unfair labor practices. If a complaint was filed,
the Board was required to give all parties due process through notice of
hearing, the right to respond, and the right to appear in person and give
testimony. Board decisions could be enforced by the courts of appeals,
and a party "aggrieved" by a Board decision could appeal the decision
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to the courts of appeals. A right to request Supreme Court review was
also included.
Finally, the Wagner Act contained certain exclusions from coverage.
Employers excluded were those who were too small to "affect com
merce," public employers, nonprofit hospitals, and railroads and air
lines, as those industries were already covered by the Railway Labor
Act enacted in 1926. Employees excluded were agricultural workers,
domestics, and employees of parents or spouses.
The Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947

Employer opposition to the Wagner Act culminated in passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Taft-Hartley addressed employer concerns
that the Wagner Act was one-sided. It amended Section 7 to make
employees© rights to refrain from union activity a right comparable to
employees© rights to engage in union activity. It created a series of
union unfair labor practices, prohibiting unions from restraining or
coercing employees and employers, from refusing to bargain, and from
engaging in secondary activity (defined as union pressure on the
employees of a neutral employer to encourage those employees to
cease work where the purpose of the pressure is encouraging the neu
tral to "cease doing business" with the primary employer). It excluded
supervisors from the law©s coverage. Hoping to speed up the Board©s
processes, it increased the size of the NLRB from three to five mem
bers, while permitting the Board to delegate its authority to three-mem
ber panels. It also outlawed the closed shop (except in the construction
industry), gave employers the right of free speech, made the certifica
tion election the preferred method of determining representation, and
permitted states to enact legislation prohibiting companies and unions
from requiring union membership as a condition of employment.
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin)
Act of 1959

The LMRDA filled some loopholes in the secondary activity provi
sions of Taft-Hartley and placed limits on recognitional and organiza
tional picketing by unions. The major purpose of Landrum-Griffin,
however, was to regulate the internal affairs of unions. It created strin-
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gent requirements on the internal governance of unions and provided
legal protection for the rights of members within their unions.
Health Care Amendments of 1974

The Health Care Amendments of 1974 brought nonprofit hospitals
and health care institutions under the jurisdiction of the NLRA in order
to eliminate the disruptions to patient care caused by recognitional
strikes in health care institutions. This concern about strikes also
resulted in the Health Care amendments creating additional dispute
resolution machinery to reduce the possibility of a strike in a health
care institution over the negotiation of a collective agreement.4

Interpretation of the Law

The NLRB and the courts have generated thousands of pages of
doctrinal law on the various provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act. This section of the chapter will give a sense of the evolution and
substance of those doctrines.
Workers Rights to Self-Organization and Concerted Activity

It is important to understand that the Wagner Act, and its successors,
gave very few rights to unions. Rather, rights were conferred upon
employees. Employees had the right to choose to unionize or not
through the right of self-organization, the right to engage in concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection, and the right to form, join, and
assist a labor organization. Taft-Hartley gave employees the right to
refrain from such activity. The employer unfair labor practices in the
law are designed to prevent employers from infringing on these rights.
Although the union unfair labor practices are somewhat more extensive
than the employer unfair labor practices, they are mainly designed to
prevent unions from infringing on employee rights and to minimize the
extent to which a union may involve neutrals in labor disputes.
Starting in the spring of 1937, after the constitutionality of the Wag
ner Act was upheld,5 the Board made decisions that became standard
labor law doctrine. Discharge for union activity, employer domination
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and assistance to a labor organization, and outright refusal to bargain
all violated the express language of the Act and were declared unlaw
ful. Using Section 8(1), the general language prohibiting employer
interference, restraint, and coercion, the NLRB declared unlawful
many of the most notorious practices of employers, such as industrial
espionage, the hiring of provocateurs, and private police (Bernstein
1969, pp. 648-50).6
Although actions that involved obvious antiunion motivation were,
not surprisingly, unlawful, the Board was also willing to look beyond
motivation to inferred effects on employee choice, regardless of
employer motivation. In the 1945 case of Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB and NLRB v. LeTourneau, the Supreme Court upheld a Board
decision finding the employer in violation of the NLRA for prohibiting
employees from wearing union buttons, soliciting for a union on nonwork time (breaks, lunch hours) on the property, and distributing
prounion literature in the employer©s parking lot. Although conceding
that the employers had not demonstrated overt antiunion animus (the
union button prohibition was adopted pursuant to its policy of remain
ing neutral in labor matters, the no-solicitation rule was designed to
maintain an orderly workplace, and the no-distribution rule was
designed to prevent littering), the Court upheld a Board ruling that the
workplace was uniquely appropriate for organizing, and some disloca
tion of the employer©s property rights was acceptable if it facilitated
employee rights under the Wagner Act.7
Board decisions, however, were subject to appeal to the courts of
appeals, and review by the Supreme Court. Subject to such oversight,
Board decisions were not always upheld. Such was the situation in the
Board doctrine that employers could not be involved in the process of
unionization. The Board rule was based on the principle that anything
the employer said during the process of unionization was inherently
coercive, given the employees© dependence on the employer. More
over, the Board believed that the unionization decision was solely that
of the employees; the employer had no right to be involved in it. In
1941, the Supreme Court rejected this view in NLRB v. Virginia Elec
tric and Power Co., in essence saying that a Board finding that an
employer committed an unfair labor practice based solely on the
employer©s, noncoercive, nonthreatening speech infringed on the
employer©s constitutional free speech rights. 8
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Virginia Electric and Power marked a watershed in labor law doc
trine. It signaled that the employer need not remain neutral during the
unionization process. Although employers were not permitted to
threaten, restrain, or coerce employees, they could give their opinions
of unions and collective bargaining (Block and Wolkinson 1986, pp.
43-82).
Employer rights in campaigns were extended further under the "cap
tive audience" doctrine. An employer delivers a captive audience
speech when it directs employees to assemble during working hours
and listen to its views on unionization. The Board in 1942 had found
the delivery of a captive audience speech unlawful, as the forced atten
dance was associated with a strong inference of employee dependence
on the employer. Such a doctrine, however, was viewed by the courts
as an unacceptable infringement on the employer©s property rights. In
1947, a court of appeals held that the employer could deliver such a
speech, provided it gave the union a similar opportunity. In 1954, the
Board ruled that the employer generally could deliver a captive audi
ence speech without giving the union the opportunity to respond so
long as the speech was delivered more than twenty-four hours prior to
the representation. The Board did not believe that the union was placed
at a disadvantage by using the traditional means of contacting employ
ees, such as in-plant solicitation, house calls, union meetings, and dis
tribution of literature.9
Virginia Electric and Power and later cases reinforced substantial
employer involvement in the unionization process during working
hours. Employee involvement, however, was limited to nonworking
hours and efforts away from the premises. 10
In 1956, in Babcock and Wilcox Company v. NLRB, the Supreme
Court overturned a Board decision and ruled that the employer did not
violate the Labor Relations Act when it prohibited nonemployee union
organizers from entering the employer©s property to solicit for union
ization. In essence, the Court ruled that nonemployee union organizers,
as distinct from employees exercising rights of self-organization, were
comparable to trespassers, and that they were not permitted on the
property unless the employees were inaccessible and the union had no
other reasonable means away from the employer©s premises to contact
the employees."
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The practical effect of Babcock and Wilcox would only become
clear after the Board and the Courts had interpreted the term "reason
able." Over the next thirty years, the courts, generally overturning
Board decisions, placed a heavy burden on unions to demonstrate that
employees were "inaccessible" away from the workplace so that they
would be permitted on the employer©s premises. By the mid-1980s the
law had evolved to the point where employees would be viewed as
accessible away from the workplace and the employer©s property if the
employees ever left the employer©s property, even if only for short peri
ods of time. Thus, employees of barge lines who live and work on the
barges and whose time spent off of the barges was intermittent and of
short duration were considered accessible away from the workplace.
Only in cases involving worksites in the Alaskan wilderness where
employees never left the employer©s property for weeks at a time were
the employees found to be inaccessible away from the employer©s
property such that union access to the property for organizing was per
mitted. This principle that employees would be considered accessible
to the union if they ever left the employer©s premises was affirmed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1992. 12
This discussion of the evolution of labor law and the law of union
organizing suggests that by the mid-1960s employers had at their dis
posal a set of tools to resist union organizing that they did not possess
in the late 1930s; in essence, employer tactics that were illegal in the
early Wagner Act years had become legal. By 1941, employers could
campaign against the union at the workplace. Between 1942 and 1954,
employers obtained the right to assemble their employees and deliver
captive audience speeches without giving the union the same opportu
nity. By the late 1960s, employers had obtained the right to keep nonemployee organizers off of their property.
By 1970, employers had almost total control over the organizing
campaign at the workplace, the place where employees congregated.
During working hours employers could campaign as intensively as
they wished, gathering employees in small and large groups to deliver
an antiunion, albeit noncoercive message. They could generally pre
vent the union from coming on the premises to present its point of
view, relegating the union to house visits, leaflets, and other voluntary
measures. Nonunion employers who were determined to resist unions
now had the means to do so.
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Given this evolution in the law, it would be expected that the per
centage of elections in which employees choose union representation
would decline. This is precisely what has happened consistently since
1942. 13
Employers© Duty to Bargain

The Wagner Act made it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse to bargain with the representative of its employees, which the
Board interpreted as an obligation to bargain in good faith. This obliga
tion was a derivative of the employees© right to choose unionization.
This right would be of little value if there were no corresponding obli
gation on the part of the employer to honor that choice.
The Wagner Act provided the Board with little guidance on the defi
nition of the phrase "to bargain." Taft-Hartley, however, added some
meat to one sentence in the Wagner Act. It amended the NLRA by stat
ing that the employer and the union had the obligation to "meet at rea
sonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms or conditions of employment" but that this obligation
did "not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the mak
ing of a concession." 14
The message from Taft-Hartley is that the obligation to bargain was
to be primarily procedural. The parties were obligated to meet and to
discuss terms and conditions of employment, but neither side was obli
gated to agree to anything. As the Supreme Court noted in the seminal
Insurance Agents case:
... the nature of the duty to bargain in good faith thus imposed on
employers by (Section) (8)(5) was not sweepingly conceived. The
Chairman of the Senate Committee declared: "When the employ
ees have chosen their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is
to escort them to the door of their employer and say,©Here they
are, the legal representatives of your employees.© What happens
behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek
to inquire into it.
.. .It is apparent from the legislative history of the whole Act that
the policy of Congress is to impose a mutual duty upon the parties
to confer in good faith with a desire to reach an agreement, in the
belief that such an approach from both sides of the table promotes
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the over-all design of achieving industrial peace. . . . But apart
from this essential standard of conduct, Congress intended that the
parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted
by any governmental power to regulate the substantive solution of
their differences. 15

Thus an important policy decision under the Act is that the Board is
not to be involved in the substance of bargaining, and may not act so as
to equalize bargaining power. The bargain between the employer and
the union must reflect the relative bargaining power, interests, and
wishes of the parties. Outcomes of bargaining are not subject to gov
ernmental intervention. Similarly, government may not affect the out
comes of bargaining indirectly by adjusting (equalizing) the bargaining
power of the parties. 16
There is no inconsistency between the existence of good-faith bar
gaining, on the one hand, and the use of bargaining weapons for "selfhelp" purposes on the other. Thus, a union may strike, a classic tactic
which is designed to inflict harm on the employer. When a union
strikes, it is hoping that the employer©s loss of business will force it to
concede to the union©s proposals before the loss of income to the union
and its members force them to concede to the employer©s proposals.
But an employer, under the self-help principle, may hire permanent
replacements for strikers so as to try and keep its business going. Alter
natively, an employer may determine the timing of a work stoppage by
locking out the employees.
By the mid-1940s, a second important issue had begun to evolve:
the scope of bargaining, e.g., about what issues must the parties bar
gain, and what issues could be addressed unilaterally by the employer?
(Millis and Brown 1950, p. 117). As Taft-Hartley limited bargaining to
"terms and conditions and employment," in 1958, the Supreme Court
ruled the parties were only obligated to negotiate over "mandatory sub
jects of bargaining," e.g., terms and conditions of employment. Matters
not falling within the definition of "terms and conditions of employ
ment" were "permissive," with either side having the legal authority to
refuse to bargain over those issues. If the parties were to be permitted
to use economic weapons (strikes, lockouts), the impasse must be over
only mandatory subjects. 17
This "mandatory-permissive distinction" generated litigation as to
whether certain employer decisions were not negotiable because they
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were not terms and conditions of employment and, therefore, not man
datory subjects of bargaining. Generally, employers would attempt to
exclude items from the scope of bargaining, while unions would
attempt to include them. The distinction became a major issue in the
1960s in cases involving major employer business and capital alloca
tion decisions that also had an effect on employment. Were such deci
sions terms and conditions of employment because they normally
involved the loss of jobs, or were they nonmandatory subjects of bar
gaining because they involved decisions fundamental to the direction
of the enterprise that were related to traditional notions of managerial
control? Over a period of almost thirty years, from 1964 to 1993, the
Board and the courts, including the Supreme Court on two separate
occasions, resolved the issue. The Board, relying on a 1981 Supreme
Court decision in First National Maintenance, accepted the principle
that decisions representing a basic change in the nature of the business
were not mandatory subjects of bargaining. In general, an employer
must bargain over a work relocation or capital investment decision
only if there is no basic change in the nature of the business and if
labor costs are such an important factor in the decision that it is possi
ble that the union could have offered sufficient concessions to change
the decision. 18
Although the mandatory-permissive distinction as it has evolved is
quite consistent with traditional U.S. notions of property rights, it has
created conflict between employers and unions over the scope of nego
tiations. Rather then encouraging the parties to work together to
resolve their problems, the First National Maintenance doctrine has
provided a vehicle for employers to shift product and make capital
investment, and by implication, employment decisions, without con
sulting with the union (Sockell 1986, pp 19-34; Block and Wolkinson
1989, pp. 2005-2056).
Case Processing Time

Generally, the Board administers the Act expeditiously. Between
1970 and 1990, it took the Board (actually the Board©s regional direc
tor) roughly forty-two days to issue a decision in representation (elec
tion) cases, with an election generally scheduled for roughly thirty
days thereafter. Moreover, about 94 percent of unfair labor practice
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cases are resolved informally, either with a dismissal, a withdrawal, or
a settlement (NLRB Annual Reports, 1976-91).
Because the Board is a quasi-judicial agency, however, parties
before the Board have certain procedural rights they may exercise. In a
representation case, an employer may challenge the union©s definition
of a bargaining unit, contending it includes classifications that do not
have a community of interest with other employees in the proposed
bargaining unit or excludes classifications that do have a community of
interest. Such a challenge, however, will result in an adversary hearing
before a Board administrative law judge if it is not resolved informally.
The losing party in the election may object to the results based on the
behavior of the other party during the preelection period. This chal
lenge is generally based on the questionable campaign tactics of the
winning party.
Processing time for unfair labor practice charges can also be
extended by a refusal of either party to settle the case. If no settlement
is forthcoming, the case will go before an administrative law judge,
who will issue a recommended order. This recommended order will
either be affirmed, modified, or rejected by the Board. Both sides have
the right to take the case to the court of appeals. There is also a right to
request review from the Supreme Court. Thus, resolution of an unfair
labor practice case, if all procedural rights are exercised, can take sev
eral years.
Even if one assumes that exercise of the legal rights is done in good
faith, the process does result in delay in resolving cases. Delay in
resolving NLRB cases not only harms the aggrieved party (usually an
employee), assuming that party ultimately prevails, it also may change
the industrial relations outcomes of Board cases.
For example, in election cases, the normal two-month time period
between a union request for an election and the election itself tends to
favor employers, as they can use their greater access to the employeevoters to influence undecided voters to vote against union representa
tion. Since the average union election is decided by only eight votes,
small increases in time are important. While it may be that this decline
in union support is the result of employees© receiving information dur
ing the campaign, voter turnout also declines with delay; one would
think that more information would cause participation to increase
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(Roomkin and Block 1981, pp. 75-97; Block, Wolkinson and Kuhn
1988; Block 1990b, pp. 145-153).
Challenging the bargaining unit also results in delay. The employer
may use the period during which the unit issue is being considered to
campaign against unionization, using the tools that it has developed.
Data indicate that employer success in elections increases when there
is a challenge to the union©s requested bargaining unit. 19
Delay in unfair labor practice proceedings, through appeals, can
have three effects. First, it puts off the remedy due to the employees. If
the employee has been unlawfully discharged or demoted, the result is
a loss of income, and possibly benefits (if the employee has been
unlawfully discharged). Second, appeals can change the outcome of a
case. While employers have the option of settling an unfair labor prac
tice charge, a recent study indicated that an employer taking an unfair
labor practice case as far as it can stands an 83 percent chance of an
ultimately favorable decision. Thus, it is not surprising that one-third
of all cases that result in a finding of an unfair labor practice by the
Board (usually an employer violation) are closed with a court order
rather than a Board decision. While this may indicate that the employer
did not violate the Act, such cases almost always involve the workplace
rights of the parties and are often value-laden industrial relations
issues. They rarely involve issues that involve the existence of the busi
ness. Such judicial behavior in overruling the Board tends to reduce the
authority of the Board and overlegalize the industrial relations system
(Block 1994, pp. 250-259; Block and Roomkin 1995).
Finally, the processing time for an unfair labor practice case affects
a related representation case. Normally, the Board will not conduct an
election while an unfair labor practice is pending, on the grounds that
its remedy will dissipate the election effects of the unfair labor practice
if the employer is found in violation of the Act.
Remedies

Because the NLRB is an administrative agency and not a court, rem
edies under the NLRA are designed to be remedial rather than punitive.
To the extent possible, the Board, through its remedies, attempts to re
create the situation prior to the commission of the unfair labor practice.
It has no authority to punish the violator.
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Under the remedial scheme of the NLRA, discharged employees are
returned to the position they would have held had they not been dis
charged, with back pay plus interest, less interim earnings. In principle,
this returns the employee to the situation in which he or she found him
or herself prior to the unfair labor practice. But the unlawfully dis
charged employee may be left without a remedy for several years if the
employer exhausts all appeals. It has been argued that such a remedial
scheme encourages employers to discharge employees for the effect of
the discharge on other employees. For the employer who is so inclined,
the cost of back pay may be much less than the cost of a union, if the
employer is able to discourage union activity and allegiance through
the discharge.20
A second remedial principle is that the Board may not impose a sub
stantive term on either party. In refusal to bargain cases, this means that
the only order the Board can issue is a cease-and-desist order, in
essence a directive that the employer stop refusing to bargain. During
the interim, while the case is being heard and decided, a process that
can take many months, the employees are without a contract. This is
one of the major reasons why only about 75 percent of certifications
result in a first contract.21
The Law and Industrial Relations

This brief overview of major NLRA doctrinal and procedural issues
indicates how that law has evolved in ways that have given employers
the legal tools to vigorously resist unions if they so choose. They have
been able to use case processing time to resist union organizing at the
workplace, and they have been able to use the mandatory-permissive
distinction to limit the scope of union involvement where unions repre
sent employees. A nonpunitive remedial scheme has provided an
incentive system that encourages employers who are so inclined to dis
regard the spirit or the letter of the law and intimidate or coerce
employees who might wish to exercise their right to self-organization.
While it is true that most employers probably do not use the legal sys
tem to prevent employee self-organization, the important point is that it
can be used that way if an employer wishes. It is these aspects of the
legal system that have caused many of the problems that surfaced in
the hearings.
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Equally important, however, although somewhat less obvious than
doctrine, are the basic principles underlying industrial relations policy
in the United States. This country has opted for minimal government
involvement in the labor relations system. As regards organizing, this
means that there are few constraints on the workplace behavior of the
employer, provided that it does not otherwise violate the rights of
employees. As regards collective bargaining with an established union,
the government is not to be involved in determining the terms and con
ditions of employment.
The bargaining process is to determine outcomes based on the pref
erences of the parties, the ideology of the parties, and the relative
power of the parties pursuant to the self-help principle. Thus, our col
lective bargaining policy permits parties to behave very well towards
each other, or very poorly towards each other. Alternatively, one party
can behave poorly and the other well. As will be seen, this system
results in a wide range of behaviors and labor relationships. 22

Industrial Relations since World War II
This legal overview examines the employment relations system that
has developed since World War II. This section will first provide an
overview of the unionized employment relations system, followed by a
discussion of the nonunion employment relations system.
The Unionized Employment Relations System
An understanding of the unionized employment relations system in
the United States can best be obtained by taking an historical perspec
tive. From the mid-1930s through the early 1980s, there was a single
dominant model for labor-management relations. It has been called the
New Deal model of industrial relations, and it can be described as insti
tutionalized adversarialism.
Features of Adversarialism
Under the New Deal system of institutionalized adversarialism, each
party recognized the institutional legitimacy of the other, with neither
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attempting to eliminate the other. The union wanted the company to
prosper, and it attempted to insure that employees share in that pros
perity. The company, although recognizing the union as the legitimate
representative of its employees, attempted to limit the union©s effec
tiveness in achieving employee gains, hoping to retain more of the
company©s surplus for the shareholders.
Not only did both sides recognize each other©s institutional legiti
macy, each side also recognized that the other had a role to play in the
system. The union recognized that it was the company©s role to manage
the enterprise: to decide what to produce, how to produce it, and deter
mine such matters as staffing, pricing, and work organization. The
union generally had no interest in becoming involved in these deci
sions. Its role was to represent the employees on matters related to
employment, and to protest if it believed that a management decision
violated the agreement or the law.
Neither party had any interest in becoming involved in the institu
tional prerogatives of the other. The company generally opposed such
union involvement; and the union, as the representative of the employ
ees, was often reluctant to be involved, preferring to protest a manage
ment decision rather than accept the political consequences of being
involved in making management decisions that might be viewed as
contrary to the interests of workers.
The parties generally negotiated collective agreements that were
detailed and highly legalistic. They dealt with such matters as institu
tional security, compensation, working conditions, and seniority.
Almost all contained a grievance procedure that ended in final and
binding arbitration to resolve disputes. Consistent with the mandatorypermissive distinction, collective agreements tended to be detailed doc
uments that limited rights of management in areas related to terms and
conditions of employment, but generally gave management wide lati
tude in other areas.
Communication was highly structured into two distinct channels:
contract negotiations and the grievance procedure. During contract
negotiations, which occurred generally every two to three years, the
parties determined the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,
generally modifying the former agreement. Once the agreement was
signed, union-management communications usually were conducted
through the grievance procedure, generally a means of protesting man-
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agement decisions through a grievance alleging that the employer had
violated the agreement. In almost all cases, an allegation that the con
tract had been violated generated a formal grievance, which was pro
cessed through two or three layers of union and management.
Grievances that could not be resolved were submitted to binding arbi
tration, a quasi-legal process before a neutral selected by a procedure
agreed to by the parties in their labor agreement.
The system of institutionalized adversarialism, although cumber
some and legalistic, proved satisfactory to both parties at least through
the mid-1970s. It met the union©s need for institutional security and for
a formal role in representing the employees. At the same time, it lim
ited union involvement to issues involving terms and conditions of
employment, and provided an acceptable means for resolving disputes
over these matters, generally leaving management free to make busi
ness decisions at the strategic level.
While protecting the institutional interests of each party, this system
tended to be inflexible. The legalistic, fixed-duration contracts could
not be modified to accommodate changed conditions unless both par
ties agreed. The rigid job structures and seniority systems in many
agreements, designed to prevent management from using favoritism
and arbitrariness in assigning jobs or laying off employees, also made
it difficult for firms to reallocate workers to more productive uses as
the need arose.
Despite these inherent difficulties, the economic prosperity during
the postwar period provided an appropriate environment for such a sys
tem. Product markets sheltered from competition provided strong prof
its which, in turn, permitted growing employment and increasing
wages. Wage increases in excess of productivity could easily be passed
on to consumers in the form of price increases. The real income of
many union members was fully or partially protected from inflation by
the inclusion of cost-of-living adjustments in collective agreements, by
which employees would receive wage increases linked to increases in
the Consumer Price Index. Thus, the overall state of the product market
offered little incentive for either employers or unions to question the
industrial relations system (Block and McLennan 1985, pp. 337-82;
Block 1990a, pp. 19-48).
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Increasing Competition and Management Strategy
The unionized sector was disproportionately affected by widening
competition in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This competition came
primarily from two sources: worldwide competition in manufacturing
and deregulation in transportation. For example, Block and McLennan
(1985) point out that import penetration in highly unionized auto and
basic steel sectors, which was negligible between the end of World War
II and 1970, had increased 20 to 25 percent by 1980. In motor freight
transportation, an industry in which deregulation commenced in 1976,
the number of licenses issued increased by 1,000 in 1980, 4,000 in
1981, and 3,400 in 1983.23 The airline industry was also affected by
new entrants taking advantage of deregulation. 24
Manufacturing and transportation also happened to be among the
more heavily unionized sectors of the economy during this period.
Whereas the overall percentage of employees represented by unions
was 23.3 percent in 1983, the rates of union representation in manufac
turing and transportation, respectively, were 30.5 percent and 46.2 per
cent.25
This competition, which was associated with declining market share
and falling profits for the unionized firms, activated management.
Many companies believed that the financial and product market com
petition facing them could no longer justify an industrial relations sys
tem characterized by ever-increasing wages and rigid rules that, while
adopted to assure objective treatment of employees, often limited man
agement©s discretion to make production changes. In short, manage
ment believed that the rule-laden system of institutionalized
adversarialism was costly and inefficient, and was often unwilling to
continue to accept it.
These changes in the competitive environment, along with a legal
system that permitted them wide latitude in making business decisions
without negotiating with the union, spurred companies to reconsider
their labor relations assumptions. Management began to use the flexi
bility in the legal system to make strategic choices about how they
would administer their industrial relations (Block 1990a).
What drove the choices? The answer varied across situations. Some
times it was a desire simply to control costs in the current production
process to meet newly emerging competition. Sometimes it was a
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desire to act on long-dormant preferences to be nonunion by using
tools that were not available before the late 1950s. Sometimes it was
part of a broader product market strategy that required a reconfigura
tion of traditional labor relations (Block and McLennan 1985).
What were these management choices? They are depicted diagrammatically in figure 2.1. In the diagram, the traditional model of institu
tionalized adversarialism is depicted as a middle option. Management
choices involved either maintaining a middle ground of institutional
ized adversarialism, or moving toward extremes of cooperation or con
flict. Some companies opted for deunionization, i.e., eliminating
unions from their operations, to the extent possible. 26 Other companies
moved toward cooperation with their unions, attempting to reduce the
amount of adversarialism in the industrial relations system. Each of
these two extreme options will be examined.27
Figure 2.1 Employer Labor Relations Strategies since the Late 1970s

Deunionization

I

Conflict

Adversarial

Cooperation

I

Investment

Deunionization.
Deunionization in the 1980s took two forms, deunionization
through conflict and deunionization through investment. Companies
that used the conflict form of deunionization would overtly try to rid
themselves of unionism in existing facilities. The most common
method was to make proposals during collective bargaining that the
company knew were unacceptable to the union in order to force a
strike. The company would then use its right to permanently replace
striking workers with new employees. A decertification attempt would
normally follow. 28 Even if the union did not strike and accepted the
company©s proposals, the employer would have reduced labor costs
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considerably and weakened the union©s credibility. This strategy is
consistent with the tactics of such companies as Phelps Dodge, Conti
nental Airlines, and Greyhound Bus Lines, all of which hired perma
nent replacements during a strike.29
Deunionization through investment was done through unionized
firms establishing new, nonunion facilities. In some cases, the firm
would invest away from the union. Thus, the newer, more productive
assets were invested in a nonunion facility. Eventually, the unionized
facility becomes obsolete, resulting in reduced employment in the
unionized sector of the firm. This occurred in the rubber tire industry.
When industry capacity shifted from bias ply tires to radial tires in the
late 1970s and early 1980s the industry made the choice to open new,
nonunion plants outside of Akron. In the construction and trucking
industries, many formerly unionized firms opened nonunion subsidiar
ies (Block and McLennan 1985; Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and
McKersie 1994; Karper 1987; and Belzer 1994).
Cooperation
While some companies moved toward eliminating unionism in their
organizations, other companies implemented the opposite strategy.
While they were willing to accept unions, they rejected the rule-laden
adversarialism associated with traditional bargaining. They advocated
the creation of new, nonadversarial structures to facilitate communica
tion and participation and joint decision making. They made a strategic
decision to reduce costs by eliminating costs associated with adversari
alism, thereby permitting the firm to exploit the knowledge of its work
ers and expand the knowledge base on which the firm could draw
(Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1994).
Such labor-management cooperation often broke down the barriers
between mandatory and nonmandatory subjects of bargaining. Workers
would be involved in product design, marketing, and other manage
ment prerogatives, often making changes in the production process.
Financial information, which was only shared under the threat of legal
action in adversarial bargaining, would be given to the union. Coopera
tion was based on notions of commonality of interest; if workers do not
know the company©s problems, they cannot help solve them. The pre
sumption was that workers possess answers and solutions that they had
been unwilling to share with management.
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Many firms established joint committees on production processes
and standards. Operating teams of workers, often self-managed, took
control over the pace of work and how the work was done. These deci
sions were no longer the exclusive province of supervisors. Indeed,
upper-level firm management often favored such systems because they
reduced the need for supervisors.
Despite the seeming attractiveness of labor-management coopera
tion, there was still much reluctance to embrace the concept. Manage
ment, the legal representative of the shareholders, was often unwilling
to be perceived as ceding its authority over the operation of the firm to
the union. Thus, while much has been done at the workplace level to
improve productivity, little has been done at the strategic level. Deci
sions such as what to produce, where to produce it, product design, and
product pricing have been left in management©s hands. Management
has not been willing to give up its control over these major decisions.
Many unions also have been reluctant to embrace such a program.
Their traditional role has been as an adversary to management to pro
test management©s actions where such protest was appropriate. Partici
pating in cooperative programs could cause members to question the
loyalty of their union representatives. 30
In addition, the two extreme strategies of cooperation and deunionization are not mutually exclusive. The U.S. auto industry has been on
the forefront of joint labor-management programs. At the same time,
they continue to produce parts in Mexico. 31
Determinants of Strategic Decisions
The common factor among all three choices traditional adversarialism, deunionization, or cooperation was that management made the
decision. Management, with its control over capital investment deci
sions based on First National Maintenance, its interest in reducing
employment costs, and its right to replace strikers if the situation came
to that, generally had the greater bargaining power in the collective
bargaining relationship. With minimal government intervention to off
set that power, management©s strategic interests generally dominated
the unionized sector in the 1980s.32
What determined management©s strategic decisions in industrial
relations? There is no fixed answer; rather, there are multiple determi
nants. Clearly a key factor was management values. Management, as
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the property owner and initiator, decided the conceptual framework
under which it viewed employment. Should the company©s employees
be viewed as a cost to be minimized or assets to be preserved because
they create value? This question, laden with values, often underlay the
labor relations strategy a company adopted. A view that employees pri
marily represent a cost to be minimized often resulted in conflict. On
the other hand, a view that employees were assets to be preserved gen
erally resulted in cooperation.
Another factor was how much strength the union had. In the auto
industry, for example, it would be difficult for the company to pursue a
complete policy of deunionization even if it were so inclined. The
union is a substantial presence at General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler
and would likely use its power where it has influence if they attempted
to substantially deunionize. For example, in 1988, the United Auto
Workers, by threatening local strikes and withdrawal from cooperative
programs, forced Chrysler to change a decision to sell its parts subsid
iary (Block 1990a).
The business strategy chosen by management often had an impor
tant impact on labor relations. A decision to be a low-cost, low-wage
producer will normally encourage the employer to deunionize if suffi
cient concessions are not forthcoming. On the other hand, if more labor
flexibility is required in a capital-intensive industry, the employer may
prefer to work with the union. A high value-added strategy was pur
sued by Xerox. In this strategy, management needed the cooperation of
the union representing its employees, and the two parties, Xerox and
the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers, took a cooperative
approach (Block and McLennan 1985; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie
1994; Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1991).
The steel industry undertook a strategy of capacity reduction. As the
problem in the industry was capacity and not cost, the steel industry
basically maintained institutionalized adversarialism, with concessions
(Block and McLennan 1985; Barnett and Schorsch 1984; Hoerr 1988).
Summary

During the period 1935-1977, the traditional system of institution
alized adversarialism dominated. It gave the union certain rights to
negotiate over terms and conditions of employment. Because there was
little competition for firms in the unionized industries, management
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strategy was generally passive or expansionary, neither of which was in
conflict with the interest of unions in raising wages and protecting
employees. As management©s strategic decisions had little relationship
to labor relations, there was little incentive to modify the adversarial
system.
By the late 1970s, and certainly with the 1981 Supreme Court deci
sion in First National Maintenance, management had acquired the
right to make major strategic decisions without negotiating with the
union. This coincided with increasing competitiveness in product mar
kets. As some companies developed strategies associated with reduc
tions in capacity or investment in new plant and equipment, their
strategic decisions began to come into conflict with union interests.
Thus, newly competitive product markets encouraged some manage
ments to assert the dominance that law had given them in labor rela
tions. This often involved challenging the long-established adversarial
system of labor relations, either through deunionization or through
cooperation. The result was a movement of industrial relations toward
the extremes.
The Nonunion Employment Relations System

With declining unionization in the United States since the late
1950s, the major phenomenon in industrial relations that has occurred
over the past thirty-five years is the rise of an actively nonunion sector.
What are the means by which this occurred? Clearly, a major factor has
been management ideology. Unlike management in Western Europe,
which developed a rapprochement with unions in the first half of the
twentieth century, management in the United States has never accepted
the legitimacy of union representation for their employees. 33 While
firms that were unionized during the period 1935-55 eventually learned
to live with their unions through institutionalized adversarialism, firms
that were not unionized during that period often determined to stay that
way. They were aided in their task by the ambivalence that U.S. work
ers have long demonstrated toward unions and collective activity and
the development of legal and management tools for union avoidance
that evolved during the 1940s and 1950s (Perlman 1966; Sisson 1987).
Union avoidance was accomplished in two major ways, which may
be described as the "soft" and "hard" systems. The soft system gener-
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ally operated under the proposition that unionization could be avoided
by making employees believe that unions were unnecessary. The hard
methods operated under the proposition that unionization should be
dealt with harshly, if it became an issue.
The Soft Approach
The soft method has been associated with such large firms as IBM,
Delta Airlines (other than the unionized pilots), Federal Express, and
Hewlett Packard. Such systems need not explicitly refer to unions or
even mention unions as a concern. Rather, they are often developed
under the assumption that it makes good business sense to treat
employees fairly and equitably. These firms believe that such treat
ment, by its nature, reduces employee interest in unionization (Kochan,
Katz, and McKersie 1994).
These soft systems developed personnel systems and practices that
created consistency among employees, in essence emulating the sys
tems of rules that resulted from collective bargaining. Increased
authority was given to corporate personnel staffs to develop policies
and to apply these policies fairly to all employees. Wages and benefit
levels of these firms were generally competitive with unionized firms.
In this way, management eliminated the major workplace abuses of the
nonunion system while still maintaining authority.
Subfunctions that supported human resources began to develop.
Recruitment and selection techniques developed to assure an appropri
ate match between the employee and organization. Firms invested in
training and career development of employees to maximize their earn
ings potential. Pay systems were rationalized, linked to the external
market, to the position, and to the employees© performance. Supporting
performance appraisal systems were upgraded and rationalized. All of
this reduced the amount of arbitrariness and supervisor favoritism in
performance appraisal systems. Some firms developed formal griev
ance and complaint procedures for employees to use if they believed
they were not treated fairly. Many firms developed participation plans,
through which employees were involved in workplace decisions.
The soft approach operates not by reducing wages, per se, but by
limiting the growth of overall labor costs through reducing the number
of workers hired and providing management with flexibility to allocate
labor in the manner that it wishes. It is based on the notion that the
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most important effect of unions in the firm is on the allocation of labor
rather than on the wage rate. It tends to be most successful in firms in
which labor costs represent a relatively small component of product
costs, that are capital-intensive, that compete with unionized firms, and
that are successful in their chosen product market. It is normally asso
ciated with deeply held values on the part of management to treat their
employees well.
The Hard Approach
The second method, the hard approach, operates by using manage
ment authority and the tools and characteristics of the legal system to
discourage employees from unionizing. The hard approach is designed
to keep the union from becoming a topic of conversation among
employees and, if necessary, to win a representation election if one was
scheduled. Although more difficult to document through scientifically
valid research, employers who choose his approach have used threats,
harassment, and intimidation to discourage employees from supporting
unionization. Although such behavior may be illegal, as discussed
above, the penalties for such activity have generally not served as a
deterrent. If an election is scheduled, employers have been able to use
the election campaign and their control over information at the work
place to erode union support among employees.
Employee Participation Plans: A Soft or Hard Approach?
As can be seen, the soft approach tends to avoid legal issues in the
hope that employees will not raise the matter of unionization. Legal
strategies and use of the legal system are not important aspects of the
soft approach. On the other hand, use of the legal system is an integral
aspect of the hard approach.
Over the past fifteen years, however, legal questions have arisen
under the soft approach when companies have instituted employee par
ticipation plans (EPPs). Although there is no legally accepted defini
tion of an EPP, it may be defined as a structure or program under which
firms solicit suggestions or input from employees on workplace issues.
An EPP can be distinguished from traditional hierarchical decision
making in a firm, under which management makes decisions based on
only intramanagement consultation, with employees being informed of
the decision and any effect on them.
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An EPP can take on a range of structures. For example, one type of
EPP involved monthly meetings among elected employees and man
agement personnel in which company plans and programs would be
communicated, problem areas identified, and suggestions for improve
ments solicited.34 Another involved inviting employees, on a rotating
basis, to monthly "rap sessions," during which company management
would solicit questions and suggestions. Based on a management
directive, representatives were elected along departmental lines by
employees.35
Section 8(a)(2) of The National Labor Relations Act makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it." A "labor organization," in turn, is
defined very broadly in Section 2(5) as
any organization of any kind, or agency, or employee representa
tion committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employ
ers concerning wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or con
ditions of work.

These two sections together were designed to assure that employee
representation was independent of the employer and that employees
were protected in the right to choose whatever form of representation
they wished; thus employees need not choose representation by a tradi
tional union.
An important interpretation of Section 2(5) was issued in 1959,
when the U.S. Supreme Court, in the Cabot Carbon case, ruled that the
term "dealing with" in Section 2(5) was broader than the term "bar
gaining."36 In Cabot Carbon, the employer had established employee
committees consisting of elected employees serving one-year terms.
The committees met monthly with plant management on working time
and were designed to consider employees© ideas on matters of mutual
interest to employees and management, and to handle employee griev
ances, although they could not issue a final decision. The monthly
meetings addressed such issues as seniority, work schedules, and vaca
tions, with the company often granting the committees© requests.
Although the employer in Cabot Carbon did not enter into a collective
bargaining agreement with the union, the Court ruled that the term
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"dealing with" encompassed activities in addition to bargaining. Thus,
an employee structure could be found to be a labor organization even if
the employer did not bargain with it.
Based on the broad definition of "dealing with" enunciated in Cabot
Carbon, when employers began to establish EPPs, a fundamental ques
tion arose as to whether these structures, generally established and sup
ported by the employer, were "labor organizations" under the NLRA
and therefore illegally dominated, because the employer©s relationship
with that EPP was one of "dealing with" the EPP (Sockell 1984; U.S.
Department of Labor 1986, 1987; Block and Cutcher-Gershenfeld
1992). Realizing that it was often important to obtain employee views
on a variety of matters, nonunion employers viewed EPPs as a legiti
mate method of obtaining information from employees who otherwise
had no desire to be unionized. Such employers did not necessarily view
them as the type of organization the NLRA had attempted to outlaw in
1935.
Unions, on the other hand, viewed many such EPPs as creating an
unlawful substitute labor organization that prevented employees from
exercising their rights to select an independent bargaining agent. In
that sense, many unions viewed these plans as precisely the type of
structure that Congress had outlawed.
These different legal views mirrored the policy debate. Were EPPs a
legal means by which management could work with employees in
workplaces in which there was no desire to be unionized to improve
productivity and quality, or were EPPs unlawful vehicles through
which employers dominated employee representation structures to
thwart the possibility of true, independent employee representation?
Put differently, did EPPs enhance employee choice by giving employ
ees a new option for representation, or did they impair employee
choice by preventing them from exercising a choice for or against their
own representative.
The 1992 NLRB and 1994 court decision in Electromation?1 and
the 1993 NLRB decision in E.I. du Pont de Nemours™ have shed some
light on the issue. In Electromation, the NLRB found that "action com
mittees" created in January 1989 by a nonunion employer were unlaw
fully dominated labor organizations. The committees addressed five
problem areas identified by the employer from meetings earlier that
month involving randomly selected employees: absenteeism/infrac-
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tions, no-smoking policy, communication network, pay progression,
and attendance bonus. Each committee consisted of management per
sonnel and six employees who had signed up. The committee members
were asked to discuss their assigned problem areas with employees.
Following a union recognition demand on February 13, 1989, the
employer informed the committees that it could no longer participate
in them, but that the committees could continue to meet on their own.
After the attendance bonus committee submitted a proposal that was
deemed unacceptable by the employer©s controller, a second proposal
submitted by that committee was acceptable to the controller but was
never presented to the employer©s president because of the union rec
ognition campaign.39
The Board found, and the court agreed, that the Electromation
action committees were illegal. First, the Court agreed with the Board
that the involvement of the Electromation employees in the committees
constituted "employee participation" within the meaning of Section
2(5). Second, the Board also found that the committees© roles consti
tuted "dealing with" the employer, as they constituted a "bilateral
mechanism" to present employee proposals to the employer. 40 Third,
the subject matter of the "dealing" was terms and conditions of
employment; e.g. pay, absenteeism/attendance, etc., as all of the mat
ters that were assigned to the committees were employment related
issues.41
On the other hand, the Electromation decisions suggest that EPPs
that do not represent employees in terms and conditions of employ
ment or deal with the employer on matters of terms and conditions of
employment are legal. Thus, if the EPP dealt solely with production,
efficiency, or quality issues (as compared to terms and conditions of
employment), if it was independent, and if it did not represent employ
ees, it would likely be legal.42 The "bilateral mechanism" concept also
implies that suggestion systems regarding terms or conditions of
employment, in which an employer takes suggestions but makes the
final decision without consulting with employees would also be legal.
That this might be the case was indicated in du Pont. Although du
Pont involved a unionized firm, some of its lessons are instructive for
nonunion employers as well. In du Pont, six safety committees and one
fitness committee were found to be dominated labor organizations. The
committees made proposals to management, to which management
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responded, and the committees had management personnel as full
members. Thus, the "dealing with" criterion was met both inside and
outside the committees. The employer established the committee©s
operating procedures, management committee members controlled the
agenda and conducted the meetings, and the committees addressed
matters involving terms and conditions of employment, some of which
had been the subject of collective bargaining negotiations.43
In du Pont, the Board stated, however, that a brainstorming group to
generate ideas was lawful because management could use or discard
whatever ideas it wished.44 A suggestion box system would not be
unlawful because the suggestions come from individuals, not groups.45
In neither case is there bilateral dealing. Similarly, a committee that
focused solely on education programs or imparted information would
not be unlawful, as the former does not involve terms or conditions of
employment,46 and the latter is not bilateral.47
Overall, then, these two key cases suggest that a nonunion employer
may establish an EPP that is designed to address solely production,
efficiency, and quality issues. For these issues, the interactions between
the employees involved in the EPP and management may take any
form desired, e.g., suggestions, consultation, or proposals. On the other
hand, to the extent such an EPP addresses issues involving terms or
conditions of employment (such as wages, vacations, or production
bonuses), it will be found unlawful if it is established as an employee
representative and if the employer does more than take suggestions or
ideas.
Development of Legislation and Law on Individual Employment Rights

While the period since the mid-1950s was a difficult one for
employees exercising collective bargaining rights in the workplace, it
saw an expansion of legislation affecting individual employees.
Clearly, the most important federal and state laws have been those pro
hibiting employment discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ori
gin, age, and disability. Privacy rights have been addressed through
legislation limiting polygraph testing. Some state courts have placed
limits on the extent to which employers can terminate employees,
essentially calling into question the long-standing principle of employment-at-will (an employee may be discharged for good cause, bad
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cause, or no cause at all so long as no other laws are violated). Other
states have found some rights for employees to have their private social
lives free from employer intervention. Recently the Family and Medi
cal Leave Act of 1993 has required employers to provide pregnant
employees with up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave, with a right to
return to the job. Workplace safety and health has been addressed
through the Occupational Safety and Health Act.48
These laws are far too broad and complex to attempt a summary of
them here. What is important however, for our purposes, is the method
by which these law are enforced. Unlike the NLRA, which is enforced
in a uniform manner by one agency, the laws are enforced by the
courts. Litigation can be arduous and expensive, and damage awards
can be substantial. Such a system makes access burdensome for
employees, who generally do not have the resources of employers. In
addition, if the employer does not prevail, the damage awards can be
very high.
Employers also complain about the burden from the regulations
associated with these laws. Equal employment opportunity laws, for
example, generally involve keeping detailed records of employees,
applicants, and their placement within organizations. Accommodation
is often required. Smaller employers, especially, claim that it is
extremely costly to them to maintain the records and to comply with
the law. While employers seem to accept the principle behind laws pro
tecting individual employees, they seem to believe that the methods of
administering the laws are extremely burdensome to them.49
What is most significant, however, about these laws, is that while
they are complex, they impose substantial record-keeping burdens on
employers, and they may require some accommodation of individual
employees, they are in no sense a broad-based regulation of employ
ment. Rather, they operate at the extremes, addressing only those situa
tions in which employment decisions come into conflict with social
norms.
The antidiscrimination laws, which are clearly the most important of
this legislation, are targeted at eliminating differential treatment
between majority employees and employees in protected classes, con
sistent with individualistic values in the United States people should
be rewarded economically on the basis of market forces, not on the
basis of personal characteristics unrelated to the market. So long as
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employers do not treat employees differentially based on race, gender,
religion, disability status, or other such protected status, employers
may do what they wish under these laws. Thus, as an example, it would
be unlawful for an employer to provide health insurance for male
employees and not for female employees. It would not, however, be
unlawful for an employer to provide no health insurance at all.
Thus, in general, these laws do not regulate the terms and conditions
of employment and day-to-day treatment of employees on the job. 50
This is still left to the individual bargain or the collectively negotiated
agreement between the employer and the employees.

Summary and Concluding Observations

Based on the discussion in this chapter, it is clear that the letter of
National Labor Relations Act makes employee choice the major value
to be protected. The law is designed to protect the right of employees
to make a choice regarding union representation. If the employees
choose representation, the employer has the obligation to negotiate
with the employees© chosen representative.
The last sixty years, however, have seen a continual, piecemeal
expansion of employer rights in the industrial relations system. In
union organizing campaigns, employers generally have daily and
almost unlimited access to employees to present their views on union
ization. Unions are generally prevented from entering the workplace,
and employee solicitation is limited to lunch periods and break times.
In collective bargaining, the overall direction of the law has been to
permit the parties to bargain with minimal government involvement,
and to engage in self-help as they see fit. Thus, the law permits
employers to exclude from bargaining most decisions that are based on
capital investment. In addition, the law permits a bargaining strategy in
which both sides can make proposals they know to be unacceptable,
and attempt to force it on the other party. The nature of the employ
ment relationship, however, limits the extent to which the union can
benefit from such a strategy. If the employer suffers economic harm
and loses business, the result is normally lost employment and lost
jobs.
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On the other hand, the law permits the employer to make an unac
ceptable proposal and stick to it, forcing the union to strike or to accept
the proposal. If the union strikes, the employer has the option of
replacing the workers, eventually eliminating the collective bargaining
relationship. In essence, the evolution of the law of bargaining has
resulted in the anomalous situation in which an employer, exercising
rights to bargain under the NLRA, can actually destroy the collective
bargaining relationship.
This evolution has been the result of the case-by-case approach to
legal decision making under the NLRA. There is no mechanism under
the Act for considering the effect of any decision on any other legal
doctrine.51 Thus, while each of these decisions may be justifiable on its
own, when they are taken together, they give the employer who is
inclined to use the legal system and resist employee choice a powerful
set of tools to accomplish its aims.
Overall, the industrial relations legal system gives employers a great
deal of discretion over how they wish to practice industrial relations.
Some employers, operating within the industrial relations/collective
bargaining system in the United States, choose to recognize the legiti
macy of employees© choice of a union to represent them and to cooper
ate with that union. Such firms, in honoring this employee choice of
representative, often involve their employees in various aspects of the
business, including production, and keep employees informed of the
company©s financial position. The union is the conduit through which
the company interacts with its employees.
Similarly, many nonunion employers also deal with their employees
fairly, openly, and honestly, often developing systems by which
employees can participate in making decisions related to quality and
production. Although these systems tend to work through the com
pany©s production organization rather than through the union, the result
is often similar to labor-management cooperation in unionized sys
tems.52 Generally, such firms operate to make unionization unnecessary
to employees. Employee choice for unionization is rarely an issue in
these companies.53
Other employers, however, operate differently. These employers use
all aspects of the law to the extreme. They may even step over the line
between legal and illegal activity, knowing that the penalties are mini
mal for such activity. Such employer activity, even if legal, may have
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the effect of impairing the mechanism by which employees may
choose whether to be represented by a union.
The next two chapters will provide examples of both kinds of
employers. Relying on the testimony from the Dunlop commission
hearings, chapter 3 will present examples of cooperative labor-man
agement relations in both unionized and nonunion firms, the former
honoring the employees© choice to unionize, and the latter making the
choice of unionism a nonissue. Chapter 4 will present examples of an
underside of labor-management relations, where employers overtly
prevent their employees from exercising their right of choice.
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CHAPTER

Labor-Management Cooperation
in the United States
The decentralization of industrial relations in the United States has
resulted in numerous examples of innovation in collective bargaining
and some examples of nontraditional employee relations in nonunion
firms. This chapter will discuss some of those programs, as they were
presented at the Dunlop Commission hearings.
For unionized firms, these programs will be discussed in the context
of two themes that emerged from the hearings: the role of government,
and the avoidance of legalism. Following the discussion of the union
ized sector, innovations in the nonunion sector will be discussed.

The Role of Government
One of the key subthemes coming out of the historical analysis in
the previous chapter is the role of government. At least since Taft-Hartley was enacted, the role of government in labor relations has been
seen as comparable to that of a judge, to be called upon only when
needed. Another way to view government©s role is that of an umpire
who sees that bargaining takes place within acceptable limits. 1 The two
governmental labor relations institutions reflect this view. The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) only addresses charges brought to it;
in essence, it is an adjudicatory agency. The Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS) was created to help resolve disputes only
when called upon by the parties. During the term of the contract, it pro
vides lists of arbitrators to rule on grievances if requested by the par-
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ties. Many states have similar structures. Thus, the major governmental
institutions were designed to be reactive.
In contrast, an examination of labor-management innovation often
shows a more activist governmental role. Two models seem especially
salient. One is the facilitation by local and county government institu
tions in the Louisville, Kentucky area. A second model, more tradi
tional than the Louisville model, can be found in the activities of the
FMCS in encouraging parties to work together.
The Louisville Model

For years, Louisville had a reputation for labor-management con
flict; indeed, in the 1970s it was often referred to as Strike City, USA. 2
The mayor of Louisville estimated that poor labor-management rela
tions cost the community 35,000 to 40,000 jobs in 1980-81. In the
early 1980s, the Mayor©s office began convening a group from the
labor community, the local Chamber of Commerce, and government to
offer solutions to labor-management problems in the community. With
support from Ford, Philip Morris (both large local employers) and
other companies, a Labor-Management Center was established at the
University of Louisville.
The result of all this was an infrastructure of labor-management
government unity that created an environment for cooperation. Much
of this was manifested in training structures. The Kentuckiana Educa
tion and Workforce Development Initiative (KEWDI) focused on
workforce development. Governed cooperatively by a collaborative
arrangement among business, education, labor, and government,
KEWDI conducts an annual survey of 1600 businesses in the Louis
ville area on the skill needs of employers. KEWDI has fourteen indus
try groupings, thus providing sufficient specialization for its
constituency. It creates and maintains a training data base through a
consortium of seventeen postsecondary educational institutions in the
metropolitan area.
Louisville area officials, however, believed that in addition to
accomplishing training and skill identification objectives, the trainingbased collaboration has had spillover effects into labor relations. This
can be seen through two relationships.
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Philip Morris, Inc. and Bakery, Confectionery, and Tobacco Work
ers Union, Local I6T? Philip Morris has 2700 employees in the Louis
ville area, with 1700 of those employees represented by Local 16T.
Prior to 1978, the parties were in a classic adversarial relationship.
Each negotiation was preceded by a strike threat, with the union finally
making good on its continual threats in 1977, when the parties experi
enced a six week strike. The adversarial system of bargaining, as it had
developed at Philip Morris, was extremely stressful and costly to the
parties. In anticipation of a strike that seldom came, the company
would build up its inventories with a great deal of overtime, which was
followed by shortened workweeks. This resulted in greater costs for
the company, both in terms of overtime preceding the end of the con
tract and, no doubt, in experience ratings for unemployment insurance
after the strike due to the layoffs.
The union also realized the hardship this placed on the members,
who would be required to work long hours before the strike deadline
a tiring schedule that reduced leisure time considerably. A spell of
unemployment would then result, either because of a strike or because
layoffs would occur while the company pared down the inventory built
up in anticipation of the strike.
After the 1977 strike, the parties decided to change. They developed
a Long-Term Agreement (LTA), which was signed in 1979. The first
LTA had a duration of nine years. The terms of the agreement would be
renegotiated every three years, but there would be binding arbitration if
there was no agreement as a result of the interim negotiations. In 1986,
the parties extended the LTA for six years, to 1994. In 1992 negotia
tions, it was extended until 1997.
Among the most important accomplishments for the union was a
provision for transfer rights to a new company facility in Carrabus
County, North Carolina, and guaranteed income protection for those
employees who did not transfer. Significantly for the union, Philip
Morris did not oppose unionization in the new facility. The company
had been able to operate successfully while unionized, and it did not
wish to alienate other unions in other plants. Interestingly, Philip Mor
ris was the object of much criticism from other firms in the Carrabus
County area for paying high wages and accepting unions.
What were the results of the LTA? Grievance activity has been down
by 90 percent since 1979. In 1988, the parties relaxed work rules,
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reduced the number of job classifications from 90 to 11, and negotiated
a no-layoff guarantee except in the event of a decline in volume below
a preset amount of production. In other words, if market share was
maintained, there would be no layoffs. The parties also developed an
employee development and training program with company-paid
tuition and fees. The training would be both general college and voca
tional education and training specific to the needs of Philip Morris. The
parties also agreed to joint labor-management safety committees and a
managed health care plan. The latter met the company©s interest in cost
savings and the union©s interest in coverage.
The company credited the efforts of the Mayor of Louisville in
bringing labor and management together as a key factor in the
improved relationship at Philip Morris. The Mayor©s efforts, in the
view of the company, created a new openness. Involvement in commu
nity and civic projects provided a vehicle for labor and management to
work together on issues of common interest outside of the plant. They
became acquainted with each other, and the good will carried over.
Louisville Gas and Electric and IBEW Local 2100. 4 The union at
Louisville Gas and Electric was initially certified in 1980. The first two
negotiations were settled only after strikes. The next two contracts
were settled without strikes, but they were difficult negotiations the
first 1989 collective agreement was rejected by a 2-1 vote.
Following the 1989 negotiations, the parties agreed to change the
relationship. They put forty labor and management officials plus the
state and federal mediators that had been working with them through
joint labor-management training in 1992. They also changed the bar
gaining process from traditional positional bargaining to mutual gains
bargaining. The latter bases negotiations on an understanding of inter
ests rather than a hardening of bargaining positions. In mutual gains
bargaining, the parties used side-by-side problem solving and bar
gained without notes.5 This clarified the issues being discussed, and it
was successful. The parties came to an agreement without a mediator.
They have since initiated mutual gains procedures in the grievance pro
cess.
Consistent with the Louisville culture, Louisville Gas and Electric
and Local 2100 have been part of a community infrastructure to help
others. They have assisted the Louisville Symphony Orchestra and the
American Federation of Musicians in establishing mutual gains bar-
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gaining. They have also had some contacts with the management of the
Louisville Zoo and the union representing zoo employees. Just as the
facilitative community in Louisville helps the parties, the parties are
giving back to the community through their aid to civic institutions.
The FMCS Assertive Availability Model

A second model may be called the "assertive availability" model.
Such a model is more activist than the traditional FMCS model. The
traditional FMCS role was to become involved, if asked, at the point at
which the parties were on strike or close to a strike. It was designed to
end labor conflict already initiated, or to avoid imminent labor conflict.
Under the assertive availability model, FMCS would intervene, if
asked to encourage the parties to move towards a cooperative relation
ship, thus preventing conflict before it starts.
The activities of the FMCS have traditionally been reactive but sup
portive. Over the last decade, however, the FMCS has expanded the
activities of its mediators. In addition to the traditional role of the
FMCS in resolving contract disputes and providing lists of arbitrators,
FMCS mediators have increasingly become involved in helping parties
use more interest-based bargaining approaches and move towards
improved labor-management relations during the life of an agreement.
FMCS has also aided joint labor-management groups (community or
workplace-based) through a competitive federal grant program that
provides modest funding for initiation or extension of innovative joint
programs.
As an example of the expanded role of FMCS, management and the
union at the Reynolds Aluminum plant in Sheffield, Alabama used
FMCS to provide training on Relationships by Objectives, which in
turn helped to facilitate their relationship. The efforts of Lyondell and
the OCAW and Healthspan Corporation in Minneapolis were also sup
ported by FMCS.
Reynolds Metals, Sheffield, Alabama and International Association
of Machinists.6 This aluminum casting facility employs 2200 people.
The IAM is one of fourteen different unions in the facility twelve
craft unions, one production unit, and one guard unit. The plant was
opened in 1941, and for the first forty years of existence was charac
terized by an adversarial relationship. Around 1980, the parties devel-
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oped CHAMPS Cooperative Hourly Management Problem-Solving
Teams to discuss work situations. In 1985, the parties used the
FMCS to provide them with additional training, and they began to
work together for job preservation and job satisfaction. They devel
oped quality teams in all departments. All fourteen unions have agreed
to worker participation and plant gainsharing; thus everybody works
to improve the financial condition of the business and shares in those
gains. They have recently built a world-class casting operation at Shef
field and this was largely a result of their good relationship. The
unions provided their support by making job classification changes;
where there were previously fourteen classifications, there is now only
one. Return on investment at the new casting operation is 18 to 21 per
cent, exceeding expectations.
Lyondell Petrochemical Co. and the Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers Union. 1 The company began operations in 1919 as Sinclair. It
was merged into Atlantic Richfield in 1968, and it became the Lyondell
Division of Atlantic Richfield in 1985. In 1993, it entered into a limited
partnership with Citgo and its parent, the national petroleum company
of Venezuela. The company has 720 hourly employees represented by
the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers (OCAW). It had a very adver
sarial history under Sinclair and Atlanta Richfield. Under Lyondell, the
management philosophy changed to one of employee involvement and
partnership. The company made a decision to involve OCAW. The ser
vices of FMCS were enlisted to teach the leadership of the union and
the refinery management about win-win bargaining. A joint steering
committee was established to continue cooperative efforts without cir
cumventing the collective agreement. Workers and management were
sent to other unionized sites where cooperative efforts were in place,
and FMCS conducted committee effectiveness training. The parties
continue to work on developing a mutually agreeable partnership.
Lyondell wants a limited partnership, in which management has the
responsibility, liability, accountability for running the business. The
union tends to be uncomfortable with a the notion of a limited partner
ship, and wants to deal with management as an equal. Although the
parties are continuing to feel their way through their relationship, they
have many years of adversarialism to overcome.
Healthspan Corporation (Minneapolis) and Service Employees
International Union Local 113.8 Healthspan is a not-for-profit health
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care system headquartered in Minneapolis. It has 15,000 employees in
Minnesota, and provides health care for 27 percent of the market in the
Twin Cities. Service Employees International Union (SEIU) Local 113
represents 2000 employees with Healthspan. Other unions representing
Healthspan employees are the Minnesota Nurses Association, Local 70
of the Operating Engineers International Union, Minnesota Licensed
Practical Nurses Association, the Association of Diagnostic Techni
cians, and UA (Plumbers and Pipefitters) Local 561.
The parties© innovative relationship began in 1983, when representa
tives from Local 113 and the other labor organizations began meeting
with representatives from United and Children©s Hospitals in St. Paul
to explore options and expand the hospital-labor organization relation
ships. In 1984, because several hospitals bargained as a group, a multihospital labor-management committee structure was developed. Initial
assistance in the form of training was provided by the FMCS. Manage
ment and labor selected their own committee representatives and deter
mined length of terms.
In 1985, United and Childrens© and the unions received an FMCS
cooperation grant of $50,000 to develop a committee structure and to
initiate joint projects on absenteeism, cost control, nursing scheduling,
career opportunity programs, and cross-training for nursing staff. The
FMCS-required 10 percent match was split between the hospitals and
the unions. After the grant ended, the parties continued joint funding
and supervision of a paid coordinator.
In April 1988, United©s parent, Health One, merged with Health
Central. The labor-management processes expanded in the new com
pany. The parties, however, were at a turning point when a manage
ment-initiated Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) plan was held
up by the unions to secure labor participation in the design and leader
ship. Eventually, with help from a private organization, the National
Center for Dispute Settlement, a new committee was created, the
Health One Labor/Management CQI Council. The parties agreed that
they would be equal partners, and they developed a written cooperative
partnership agreement.
In March 1993, Health One and Lifespan merged to form Healthspan. Lifespan, although organized, had maintained a more traditional
relationship. After the merger, new labor-management processes
needed to be developed. FMCS and the Minnesota Bureau of Media-
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tion Services provided funding and assistance towards the establish
ment of a Metropolitan Hospitals Labor/Management Council,
composed of twenty hospitals, nine unions, and a separate Twin Cities
Area Labor/Management Council, which was co-chaired by a human
resources officer from Healthspan and a local official from SEIU. As a
result of the efforts of the Labor/Management Council, the Council of
Hospital Corporations (CHC), which is the hospital trade association,
has examined existing labor relations practices and has developed
goals supportive of the mutual gains-equal partners approach. Local
113 and CHC negotiated a contract using a mutual gains bargaining
approach. They also concluded successful mutual gains bargaining.
Both the CHC and Healthspan agreements establish a joint approach to
work redesign and state that no layoffs will occur as a result of work
redesign.
The Healthspan co-sponsorship agreement includes the corpora
tion©s employee relations principles, an outline of its labor-manage
ment partnership structures, a code of trust to guide dealings, the
relationship to the collective bargaining agreement, management pol
icy, and the parties© views on employment security. It was approved by
the Labor/Management CQI Council. The cosponsorship agreement
does not modify the collective bargaining agreement.
What are the key features of the Healthspan-SEIU system? Any item
on which both parties can agree may be discussed in the partnership. A
corporate document that covers all subsidiaries requires decentralized
decision making at sites. Management believes its union members sup
ported CQI, while labor feels that management is interested in the
security and well-being of employees. There are to be no layoffs due to
CQI. The arrangement is voluntary and is reevaluated yearly. Neither
side will withdraw without first seeking the intervention of a third
party who will attempt to resolve the problems leading to the proposed
withdrawal.
The support structure for the partnership includes a Joint Labor
Management Council (JLMC), operating unit (hospital) LMCs and
bargaining unit LMCs. The JLMC has twenty-five members, including
executive management and union leadership, with labor and manage
ment co-chairs. The operating unit councils are approved by the corpo
rate council. There are thirteen bargaining unit councils, which meet
once per month and are co-chaired by labor and management. They
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have established budgets, ground rules, and meeting agendas devel
oped by the co-chairs. Each organization also has ad hoc CQI teams
that are project-based.
What has been done? The CQI team solved problems with linen dis
tribution in one hospital by instituting a just-in-time delivery system
that saved $3 million dollars in inventory costs. There is a joint effort to
reduce costs by $10 to $17 million at Unity and Mercy Hospitals.
Working with a physician steering committee, a CQI team is jointly
restructuring service delivery, with the LMC as the link between the
redesigned processes and the workforce. A July 1991 closure of a
downtown Minneapolis hospital that was losing millions of dollars per
year tested the effectiveness of the joint effort. Facing projected unem
ployment insurance and severance payments estimated to be from $10
to $18 million, the joint committee was able to design a process of clo
sure costing only $500,000, with 90 percent of the 1,475 employees
placed in new jobs.
Summary
As can be seen, government has played two different kinds of roles.
One, based on the Louisville model, may be called "direct encourage
ment." By bringing the parties together and encouraging them to set
aside differences, structures are created. By the government taking the
position that labor-management cooperation is the preferred method of
dealing with workplace problems, government has legitimized such
relationships. Given the current legal structure, this is perhaps the most
a government is able to do to encourage cooperation.
A second model may be called the "assertive availability" model. In
this model, government stands ready with resources to help parties, but
offers these assertively before being asked. The activities of the FMCS
in the Reynolds-IAM, Lyondell-OCAW, and Healthspan examples, and
the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services in the Healthspan exam
ples demonstrate government supporting cooperative efforts with both
human and financial resources. This is the traditional role of govern
ment in the United States. It is supportive, but still noninterventionist.
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Avoidance of Legalism
The law is associated with an adversarial process. The assertion of
legal rights by one party vis-a-vis another party is, by definition, adver
sarial. Thus, it is not surprising that a key characteristic of innovative
relationships is the absence of legalism. Innovative workplace relations
do not rely on legal rights; rather they move beyond them. The law, as
it has evolved, gives the employer the right to overtly resist unionism
during the organizing campaign. Even if the union is certified, the law
has given the employer the right to use the legal system to continue
opposition to unionism and to contain unions. In other words, the
employer has the legal right to continue to oppose unionism in its facil
ities whether the union is certified or not. Despite this, in the examples
to be discussed in this section, there is little reliance of the employer on
these legal rights. Ford Motor Company has been one of the most inno
vative companies vis-a-vis its relationship with the union representing
its employees (the United Auto Workers). Peter Pestillo, executive
vice-president for corporate relations for Ford was asked about how the
law affects Ford and the UAW. Pestillo responded:
I think the National Labor Relations Act plays a very small role in
our lives. We©ve got a long history and culture that allows us to
operate and I think that©s an important distinction. We©re not bur
dened by it, quite frankly. We don©t recklessly violate it, mind
you, but with a 100,000 people, over the course of a year you
won©t see NLRB charges to Ford Motor company.9

Management, in these examples, does not keep information from the
union, although they may have the legal right to do so. They often do
not assert their legal right to make decisions regarding the direction of
the business free from union "interference," although they may legally
do this. They do not use the negotiation process to make proposals that
the union must find unacceptable, as they may, force a strike, and then
exercise their legal rights to replace those strikers.
Rather, the parties recognize the legitimacy of one another. The
company not only recognizes the union in the legal sense, but also in
the practical sense, as the true representative of its employee-stake
holders. As will be seen, the parties that have successful relationships
do not interact through the legal system. They negotiate based on their
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respective interests. Although not all of the parties have reached the
same level of cooperation, all of these relationships are characterized
by mutual respect for the legitimacy of the other party and by reliance
on negotiation rather than legal confrontation.
Ford Sharonville (Ohio) Transmission Plant and the United Auto
Workers. 10 The Ford Sharonville transmission plant, near Cincinnati,
employs 2,000 people. The plant manufactures two automatic trans
missions: the E40D, fully electronic, described as "the newest and best
in its field;" and the C6, an older type. The transmissions go in F-series
trucks and Econoline vans.
In the early 1980s and as late as 1986, Ford had intended to close the
facility. For years the plant management and the union at Ford Sharon
ville had a traditional, nonparticipative relationship. The parties real
ized, however, that they would need to change in order to save the plant
and the jobs of the employees. The change in the relationship started in
1979. with a National Letter of Understanding negotiated between
Ford and the UAW. The purpose was to make the company and the
union aware of different options for ordering their relationship. In
1980. a joint Employee Involvement (El) steering committee formed at
Sharonville. The company members of the steering committee were the
plant manager, the industrial relations manager, two area managers
within the plant, and the quality control manager. The union members
included the entire bargaining committee.
In 1981, joint El coordinators were appointed and El pilot groups
started among hourly and salaried employees. In 1983, El area sub
committees formed from middle management and the plant floor com
mittee. In 1985, the first self-directed work team was piloted. That was
the same year that the plant was awarded the E40D transmission.
After the E40D award, the skilled trades (electrical, hydraulic,
machine repair, and tool makers) established cross-functional teams to
launch new equipment. The teams were provided with eighty hours of
training in order that each trade could learn the basics of the other
trades. Although this was a voluntary program for the skilled trades,
over 90 percent of the skilled tradespeople in the plant participated.
Local management and the union together determined the selection
process for staffing new teams, posted jobs, and explained expectations
to those who volunteered. There would be a single classification for
manufacturing manufacturing technician. Each technician was given
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three weeks of training before being assigned to a team; two weeks of
technical training and one week of instruction on working in teams.
Additional training was provided after people were assigned to teams.
This training included roles and responsibilities of team members,
problem solving, and conflict management.
The manufacturing team consists of eight to twelve manufacturing
technicians, an hourly team coordinator (who, at that time, was paid an
additional 10 cents per hour and was elected by the team, with some
encouragement to rotate among team members), and a salaried advisor
(formerly a supervisor but now more of a coach). The manufacturing
technicians are paid, according to knowledge, up to four or five levels.
The team reports to the superintendent. If there are disagreements, they
go to the plant manager, and then, if necessary, to the plant manager
The technicians are responsible for production, scheduling lunch
and relief, and vacations. They work with the advisor to obtain
approval for overtime. They schedule overtime, determine training
needs, and train others as appropriate, decide daily job assignments
and rotations, and ensure proper coverage of critical jobs. The team
coordinator chairs team meetings, attends appropriate safety, quality,
and other plant meetings.
The team process was reviewed in 1990 and monitored thereafter. In
1991, it was determined that additional training was needed, especially
for the advisors.
Training is important at Ford, as it provides a flexible structure for
consistency. A total of 151 personal development courses can be taken
at the plant, with all the courses designed at the national level.
The results have been dramatic. Between 1988 and 1992, there was
a 40 percent drop in first-time visits for medical attention and a 53 per
cent improvement in quality. Total safety costs have improved by 57
percent since 1979. Sharonville, a plant that ten years ago was slated
for closing, recently won an internal bid for transmission work that will
keep the plant in operation at least through the year 2000.
At Ford Sharonville, there appears to be a blurring of the line
between hourly workers and supervisors. Indeed, the team, staffed by
hourly workers, does much of the work scheduling that has tradition
ally been the prerogative of supervisors. The company has been quite
willing to share its management prerogatives with the union, although
the law obviously does not require them to do so. When the relation-
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ship between the company and the union is one of trust, the law tends
not to be an issue.
New United Manufacturing Company (NUMMI) and the UAWU The New United Manufacturing Company (NUMMI) is a joint venture
of General Motors and Toyota, producing small cars in an old GM
plant in Fremont, California. NUMMI grew out of the deep recession
in the early 1980s, during which California©s number of auto plants
dropped from 8 to 1. Among those closed was the GM plant in Fre
mont.
In 1983, GM and Toyota established a joint venture to run the
former GM plant according to Toyota©s production system. The plant
had one of the worst disciplinary and grievance records in the GM sys
tem. NUMMI management had doubts about dealing with the Fremont
workforce, but decided to establish a "win-win" relationship. As a ges
ture of good faith, they agreed to hire back the old workforce and to
pay wages and benefits comparable to those received by UAW-represented employees in the auto industry. In the event of a downturn in
sales, management agreed not to lay off any employees until manage
ment salaries were reduced, subcontracted work was brought back in,
and then only if the long-term financial viability of the firm was at
stake. They have kept that pledge. The union, for its part, agreed to the
Toyota team concept, to give up traditional work rules, and to become
co-responsible with the company for improving quality and productiv
ity.
In order to accomplish this, a culture change was required. The mil
itant shop committee was rehired, as a company commitment to work
ing with the representatives of the employees. This committee
participated in staffing the facility. The first several months were spent
interviewing for team leaders (foreman equivalents). Once the plant
was up and running, the UAW was given the right to slow down the
line at any time if there were quality problems. A job security clause
was incorporated into the contract so people would not think they
would lose their jobs if they made suggestions. Production was slowly
increased until the line could be run at full without sacrificing quality.
The company has been willing to involve employees in almost every
phase of the operation. Typical management symbols like a separate
cafeteria and parking spaces are gone. With 4,000 employees, only
twenty-two grievances had been submitted for outside resolution after
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ten years. There were twenty-two grievances submitted for outside res
olution each month under the former GM management. The contract
provides employees with job security and "top of the industry" wages,
which, from the point of view of the union, was an essential trade-off
for successful team efforts to increase quality and productivity.
Miller Brewing and UAW Local 2308. n ln October of 1990, Miller
Brewing decided to open a plant in Trenton, Ohio, near Cincinnati. The
company wanted a high-commitment, high-performance, multicultural
work environment with work teams exemplifying self-management,
continuous improvement, and operational flexibility. The company,
however, also assumed that the plant would be organized, as the brew
ing industry has traditionally been unionized. Thus, the company rec
ognized the UAW as the bargaining representative of its Trenton
employees.
Operationally, although management retained certain responsibili
ties, there was union involvement at every level, including weekly staff
meetings. The roles of labor and management were redefined. The par
ties developed two documents. The first, the traditional collective bar
gaining agreement, was expected to be constant during its life. The
second, the Trenton Brewery Operating Guidelines, included proce
dures the parties expected to change to ensure that the plant was
responsive to customers and the workforce. The parties developed an
Issue Resolution Procedure, which permitted all members of the work
force and their team managers, on a rotating basis, to resolve problems
and set plantwide policies.
Another structure, the Policy Review Board, takes plant manage
ment and local union interests into account, gathers data, and formu
lates policy independent of the corporate office and the international
union. An extensive communication network was developed which
included e-mail for every employee, daily information meetings, morn
ing production planning meetings, weekly communications meetings,
monthly three-shift meetings, and an annual plant conference, for
which the plant shuts down for a full day, with outsiders making pre
sentations.
In terms of plant performance, the relationship seems to be success
ful. The plant experienced a very fast start-up. In October of 1993, it
was producing about 40,000 barrels per day; it was 50 percent more
productive than other Miller operations.
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Miller Brewing could have exercised its legal rights to resist the
union; it chose not to do so. Rather, the company accepted the legiti
macy of the union and determined to negotiate with the union as the
representative of its employees. The results have been excellent for all
concerned.
BellSouth and Communications Workers of America. 13 The relation
ship between BellSouth and the Communication Workers of America
(CWA) has historically been conflict laden. After a series of strikes in
the 1970s, the CWA and BellSouth leadership decided that more could
be done by working together than by airing differences in the old way.
The parties changed the grievance procedure to permit a union steward
to talk to a supervisor without writing a formal grievance. The parties
decided that any such grievance settlements would be nonbinding and
nonprecedent setting. This helped to resolve problems at the lowest
level, creating dialogue instead of confrontation.
After a strike in 1983 over health care, BellSouth and the CWA
established a joint committee on health care, moving toward managed
care with union involvement. CWA locals had direct input on hospitals
to be included in the network. As a result, health care was not an issue
in the negotiations of 1986, 1989, or 1992.
The parties then moved to other issues. Given the rapidly changing
competitive environment in the communications industry, BellSouth
and the CWA determined that the traditional collective bargaining rela
tionship of periodic contract negotiations with a voluminous, inflexible
agreement was no longer appropriate. In 1991, at the beginning of the
current contract, the parties agreed to establish, on a trial basis, a con
tinuous standing bargaining committee. It was the charge of this com
mittee to deal with festering work rule matters that had traditionally
been put aside during bargaining, in order to get the contract com
pleted.
Discussions in the new committee were low-profile, low-key, and
nonthreatening. No demands were made. Seating at the meetings was
interspersed rather than each party sitting on its side of the table. No
bulletins were issued on the progress of the negotiations that could
cause constituents to put pressure on their representative. The parties
found that they were more honestly communicating needs and identi
fying issues. Thus the parties will again bargain this way when they
negotiate their next three-year agreement.
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Despite the good will of the parties, there continue to be points of
disagreement. BellSouth has been reducing employment and requiring
remaining employees to work harder. Workforce reductions have led to
additional grievances. This reminds us that while there is much that
brings the parties together, there is also much that continues to divide
labor and management.
Although the relationship has not been smooth, as would be
expected given the uncertainty in the telecommunications industry, the
parties have not stood on the legal rights to eschew negotiations during
the term of the agreement. They have moved into a problem-solving
mode rather than a rights mode.
Ciba-Geigy, Mackintosh, Texas and the Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers Union. 14 Ciba-Geigy built its Mackintosh facility in 1952. The
plant was organized by OCAW in 1956. The plant has 1,332 employ
ees, of which 700 are represented by the OCAW.
The first twenty-five years of the relationship were contentious,
including a strike in 1974. The plant had experienced frequent layoffs
and indifferent hiring. It was losing patents and was adversely affected
by the bad public image of the chemical industry.
With the survival of the plant at stake, a new site manager was
assigned to Mackintosh in 1980. He removed management perks,
expressed a concern for the environment, and moved towards improv
ing the labor-management relationship through employee involvement.
Mackintosh is now a leader in health, safety, and environment, through
the efforts of its joint committee dedicated to these ends. There also is
a joint labor-management council in place with which the company
shares information and agrees on training. Productivity has improved,
and there have been no layoffs at Mackintosh since 1984.
National Steel and the United Steel\vorkers of America. 15 National
Steel is the fourth largest steel company in the United States. It is 72
percent owned by NKK of Japan. National Steel is a fully integrated
steel company, with such major customers as General Motors, Ford,
Chrysler, Toyota, Nissan, Honda, and Del Monte. The company has
experienced difficult times in the last two decades, with employment
dropping from 25,000 in 1968 to 10,000 in 1993. During the 1980s,
demand for steel was declining at the same time that competition was
increasing. This decline in demand was caused to a large extent by the
rise of steel substitutes, such as aluminum for cans and plastics in auto-
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mobiles. At the same time, competition was increasing; imported steel
currently accounts for 30 percent of the market in the United States.
Given these changes in the steel market, National decided in 1983
that the traditional multiemployer bargaining structure no longer suited
it. They no longer wished their competitors, such as US Steel and
Bethlehem, negotiating for them, and they no longer wished to deal
with the United Steelworkers through an adversarial relationship.
Thus, in 1984, National withdrew from multiemployer bargaining to
pursue a cooperative bargaining approach.
The collective bargaining relationship between National Steel and
the Steelworkers, prior to 1984, was described as "open warfare" by a
union representative. 16 In 1984, however, the company approached the
union in an attempt to change the relationship and to build mutual trust.
The parties established study committees of staff representatives and
company officials, with support from international union headquarters
and corporate headquarters for financial and benefits expertise. Rules
were established. The committee would discuss issues, but these would
not be negotiating sessions. The company would provide all informa
tion requested, eschewing claims of confidentiality. In return, the union
agreed not to reveal it. Each side selected an outside consultant, which
had to be approved by the other party.
The parties met on issues involving safety and health, employment
security, benefits, insurance, pensions, and profit sharing. Eventually,
the cooperation became so deeply embedded that one "could not tell
who is union and who is management." 17 The program survived a scare
in 1985, when the company requested concessions, but the parties
worked through it.
The committee system was carried over into bargaining. The parties
strengthened it in the 1989 agreement, and in 1993 they negotiated a
six-year agreement. The 1993 agreement includes a formal cooperative
partnership, which includes the president and chief operating officer of
the company, and the international president of the union. This partner
ship group does strategic planning for how the cooperative process
should go forward. It is a structured approach at plant level where lead
ers steer the process down to the shop floor level, where foreman and
stewards are the leaders.
What have been the results of this change? Employees have guaran
teed employment security except in a complete shutdown of a facility
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or with the approval of the Steelworkers international president. The
union is committed to productivity improvements, including craft com
binations; indeed, in Michigan, the parties reduced the classifications
to two crafts, mechanics and electricians. Employees have been given a
stake in the business through profit-sharing and gainsharing and an
intellectual stake through the cooperative partnership.
From the financial viewpoint, employment costs stayed basically flat
from 1986 through 1993, while productivity increased. In 1984, pro
ductivity was 5.5 person hours per ton; by 1993, this had been reduced
to less than 4 person-hours per ton. Productivity gainsharing was $25
million in 1992. When there were profits in 1987-89, there was also
profitsharing $40 million in 1988.
In 1991, the company went to the union asking for help. The union
responded by reducing costs $100 million in the second half of 1991.
National Steel was the only major steel company that was profitable in
1991. As for the employees, when the rest of the industry laid off an
average of 10 percent of its workforce in 1991, National Steel laid off
only 150 employees, all of whom had not been employed the one year
required to earn employment security rights.
Finally, it is interesting to note that National Steel is the most
heavily unionized major steel company in the United States; all of the
office workers are unionized. The union attributes this to a neutrality
pledge by National Steel. The company recognizes the right of the
union to exist.
Summary
Consistent with the subthemes raised in the previous chapter, both
parties in these relationships eschew reliance on their legal rights.
There is no claim on the part of the employer that some subjects are
nonmandatory or out of bounds, despite their legal right to do so. These
parties view labor relations in a problem-solving and issue-oriented
framework rather than as a battle of relative rights.
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Employment Relations Innovation in Nonunion Firms
As noted in the previous chapter, the most salient aspect of employ
ment relations since the 1970s has been the rise of the nonunion
employment relations system. All of these systems, however, could
fairly be described as "top down." The employer, acting on its own,
would determine terms and conditions of employment, such as pay and
benefit systems, performance appraisal systems, career paths, and pro
motional criteria. While human resources departments would take into
account such factors as market trends, the actions of comparable orga
nizations, or fairness, it was also true that such systems lacked one
important feature of the unionized sector a formal, recognized mech
anism for obtaining employee views on various matters.
As competition increased in the 1980s, it became increasingly
important for firms to tap the expertise of all of their employees, pro
duction and clerical as well as supervisory and management. Indeed, it
soon became clear that improvements in the production process of
many goods and services could be made without substantial capital
outlays by relying on the knowledge and suggestions of those who
were most intimately familiar with the production process employees
who were actually doing it.
Firms also began to realize that management did not always know
the wishes of employees. High morale and job satisfaction often
required knowing what employees wanted, not only in wages and ben
efits, but also with respect to such matters as equipment, production
processes, and safety.
Thus, some nonunion firms began to create processes to formally
obtain employee input on a variety of matters. As discussed in the pre
vious chapter, these plans and processes often did raise legal questions.
Were the companies that established them in violation of the National
Labor Relations Act? If not, would the NLRB be condoning structures
that might be designed to prevent employees from choosing an inde
pendent representative? If so, was the legal system denying nonunion
employers the right to consult with their employees who did not
choose union representation? The cases in this section discuss different
forms of innovative, nontraditional employment relations systems in
nonunion companies. 18
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Donnelly Corporation.^The Donnelly Corporation, which was
founded in 1905, is an automotive supplier of interior and exterior mir
rors and encapsulated modular windows. The company also supplies
glass components for appliances. It has annual sales of about $300 mil
lion and employs 2,600 workers worldwide. Two thousand employees
are in twelve facilities in western Michigan. The company also has
facilities in Ireland, Arizona, and Kentucky, and joint ventures in Colo
rado, Tennessee, and California.
The company has been a model of innovative employment relations
for forty years. It adopted a Scanlon Plan (profit- and gainsharing plan)
in 1952. The principle behind the plan was to encourage employees to
help make improvements and to share the results of those improve
ments. In the late 1960s, the company went to a team concept, elimi
nating time clocks and putting all employees on salary within the
constraints of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
In the late 1960s, the company created an "equity structure," which
is now a "representative structure." It incorporates a hierarchy of com
mittees, with the Donnelly committee at the top. The structure pro
cesses all wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of employment
and provides a safety net for the grievance process and a guarantee that
people have a voice in the development of policies that affect them.
The structure operates on the principle of unanimous agreement, which
is really a system of full consultation.
An excellent example of how the Donnelly process works was pro
vided by three employees from the modular systems department,
which produces two kinds of windows for one of the domestic auto
companies. According to the employees, the department was a poor
place to work in 1989-90. There were obvious distinctions between
desirable and undesirable jobs, costs were high, yields were low, and
quality was poor. The team leadership decided that a change was nec
essary. They believed it was important for people to know the entire
process in the department. Thus, on the initiative of the representatives,
all teams were taken off-site for training. The production system was
redesigned and the representatives made sure that the support systems
and reward systems fit the new operating system. After redesign, crosssectional teams were created to address issues and concerns from the
redesign. Since implementation started in mid 1991, there has been a
65 percent reduction in customer returns and scrap, a 25 percent
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improvement in productivity, and a substantial improvement in the
work climate.
A Delta (change) Continuous Improvement Plan was also initiated.
Teams were empowered to make decisions and involve others if neces
sary. The team analyzes problems and implements solutions. A team
may solicit help from customers (auto companies) and suppliers.
Before Delta, average production was pieces 471 per shift with five
people on line; after Delta, yield was 526 pieces per shift with four
people. The yield (good parts) is 98.6 percent.
Herman Miller Corporation.20 Herman Miller is an office furniture
manufacturer headquartered in western Michigan. The firm employs
5,700 people worldwide. Employee participation at Herman Miller
began in the 1950s with a Scanlon Plan. The major thrust of the Her
man Miller system lies in its values. The company believes that every
employee is "authentic," and that all employees are entitled to be
treated with courtesy and good manners. Operationally, the company
has moved from a hierarchically structured organization to what it calls
an "adaptable relational organization." Currently, annual corporate
planning involves every employee. Every employee with one year of
tenure is given stock through profit-sharing. Employees with two years
service are provided with a "silver parachute" designed to protect them
from unjust discharge or job reassignment in the event of a takeover.
The "parachute" provides one year of wage continuation and mainte
nance of health benefits. The cash compensation of the chief executive
officer is capped at twenty times the average salary of the manufactur
ing employee average.
As regards day-to-day workplace issues, the company has work
teams, with team leaders selected by management based on the compe
tencies and work required to lead a group of people. For issues of dis
charge, there is an internal appeals board made up of five members
chosen by the employees from a board of ten. There is a suggestion
review board, selected by management, which follows up on all
employee suggestions. The suggestor is included in the follow-up, and
the suggestor may appeal to management if his or her idea is not
accepted.
Delta Airlines. 21 Delta believes that its success is based on the rela
tionship between management and personnel, and the flexibility this
provides. From Delta©s perspective, the essential components to devel-
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oping a strong relationship are cooperation, employee participation,
and treating employees with dignity. The company holds personnel
meetings every twelve to eighteen months. During 1993, Delta CEO
Ron Alien visited all major cities and held town hall meetings to impart
management©s vision of the future and address employee concerns. All
senior management frequently visit personnel in operating areas and
volunteer to work side-by-side with employees loading bags, cleaning
airplanes, and providing customer service.
When severe competition in the airline industry required Delta to
implement cost reductions, including a 5 percent pay reduction and
several changes to their benefit package, the relationship was tested but
employees were ultimately supportive because of previous education
and communication. As part of the cost reduction plan, a president©s
team was established to evaluate employee suggestions. There were
20,000 suggestions, resulting in $50 million in actual savings.
In maintenance and technical operations, Delta has a technical eval
uation committee composed of employees who leave their current job
assignments to analyze technical and mechanical systems and to think
of ways to reengineer processes. In addition, other employees also sub
mit suggestions to the committee. The company also has corporate
safety teams for large operational areas, tuition assistance, a destina
tion program for language learning, and a development program for
managerial and process skills. In Delta©s view, improvement of workermanagement relations is a function of each enterprise; each corpora
tion and their employees need to explore what works best.
Coca-Cola, USA. 22 At Coca-Cola©s Nashua, New Hampshire plant,
the company has been implementing total quality work design efforts
(TQWD) a process of changing work to improve productivity and
quality, create more efficiency and shared responsibility, and provide
better jobs. Although the Nashua plant is the premier syrup plant in the
system, the employees and management wished to improve. The com
pany taught people how to be involved in the business and provided a
shared vision and a common framework. Training was offered to
employees in interpersonal skills, teams skills, meeting management
skills, and business skills. Following this, employee groups undertook
an analysis of the business, technical, and social environment, with the
customer as the focal point. Seven committees were created: public
service; branch activities; budget; associate motivation and policy
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enforcement; health and safety; continuous improvement; and training
and development.
Texas Instruments, Inc.23 Texas Instruments has developed a team
concept in its microcircuit board shop and in its manufacture of infra
red imaging devices. The microcircuit board goes into the seeker selec
tion section of the HARM missile. Until 1990, management told the
shop employees what they would do each day and how many boards
they would build. There was no cross-training and no way that the
employees could educate themselves in other shop processes. In gen
eral, employees had no idea how the shop ran, and they believed their
input was not valued.
In 1990, the shop was organized into seven process teams, each
building a product from start to finish. The teams cross- train each
other. As a result, absenteeism or vacation scheduling do not shut the
shop down. The team has the authority to manage day-to-day opera
tions, assumes all supervisory responsibilities, such as approving labor,
tracking the support of other teams, initiating corrective action on per
formance issues, staffing, and managing overtime, which includes try
ing to reduce it. The team does action plans based on production trends
tracked. As a result, between December 1990 and December 1993,
cycle time was reduced by 64 percent, quality increased 20 percent,
and production staffing dropped 46 percent, all with improved
employee self-esteem.
A second example is the "diamond turning point team." The team
produces optical components for the Texas Instruments defense sys
tems and electronics group, using a gem quality diamond to produce an
optical grade surface on the infrared imaging piece parts. In June,
1992, the department implemented a five-star point team: the five star
points were administrative, quality control, methods and tooling,
safety, and production control. Each star point acts as liaison to the rest
of team. Quality has improved, with defects dropping from 375 in
1991 to 35 in 1993. Cycle time is down from six days to one day,
improving on-time delivery. The method improvement program lets
workers make changes in the processes. Workers ideas generated sav
ings of $65,000 in 1993.
D.D. Williamson and Co. 24 D.D.Williamson, in Louisville, is part of
an international group of small companies that manufacturers caramel
colors. The firm has 800 customers and a 40 percent market share. This
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nonunion firm uses teams and employee involvement. All employees
are members of quality teams. There are also multifunctional productoriented teams. One team generated $70,000 in savings by solving an
effluent problem. An information systems team put in a new computer
system for the company. The company invests heavily in training and
education. Prior to 1987, the average employee received approximately
ten hours of training per year. Since 1987, the average employee yearly
receives sixty to eighty hours of training. The plant shuts down one day
per quarter to facilitate various kinds of training. The firm©s self-man
aged work teams allowed the company to replace supervisors with
team leaders, who have the authority to hire, fire, and rotate workers.
Each associate has a $374 voucher that can be spent in any plantrelated way he or she wishes, either individually or by combining with
the vouchers of other employees. All employees visit and make presen
tations to customers; they also must make a presentation at their own
plant when they return.
Lantech, Inc. 25 Lantech, Inc. is a Louisville firm that manufactures
and markets stretch packaging machinery. Established in 1972, the
company had $40 million in sales in 1992. The firm employs 280 peo
ple. Its main customers are Fortune 500 companies who use the pack
aging to wrap their product. Benefits provided by the company include
full health and life insurance, tuition advances, a computer loan pro
gram, a four-day, ten-hour workweek, flexible hours, and internal
placement. The company has an open door policy, with each employee
having the capability of sending voice mail to anybody in the firm,
including the owner. There is a complete sharing of information. Once
per month, there is an all-employee meeting on the financial condition
of the firm, orders, and company strategy. There are also monthly divi
sion meetings.
Summary

The seven examples brought forth indicate the range of innovation
that nonunion firms have initiated without the constraints of the law.
With the exception of Donnelly Corporation, and in that case, only in a
minor way, none of the innovations focused on wages, hours, and
working conditions. The major thrust of these innovations seems to be
to change the organization of work so that workers can contribute to
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the production process and the success of the firm. The team processes
that have been established not only provide workers enhanced selfesteem and job satisfaction, they also have made substantial and mea
surable contributions to firm performance.

Conclusion

This chapter does not purport to be a complete analysis of labormanagement cooperation in the United States. In that regard, we are
aware that the presentations at the hearing were likely to be biased
toward success stories, as only those successful programs would be
willing to go public. The purpose of this volume, however, is not to
analyze the reasons for success and failure of innovative labor-manage
ment programs. That has been done elsewhere.26 Rather, the purpose of
this volume is to demonstrate the range of relationships possible under
the current industrial relations legal structure in the United States.
Thus, these cases should be viewed as evidence of the existence of
such structures, not as evidence of their long- term success.
Indeed, it should be observed that not every relationship featured
was an unqualified success. The presenters discussing the relationship
between Lyondell and the OCAW, for example, freely admitted that the
parties have not had the success they would have liked, as they cannot
agree on the level of the union©s participation.
Is is also conceded that such cooperative programs are not the only
means to productivity; traditional labor relations can also lead to pro
ductivity gains.27 The point, however, is that a firm can be productive
through cooperation as well as through conflict, suggesting that the
choice of labor relations models, per se, does not necessarily determine
productivity.
Overall, three observations seem especially relevant at this point.
First, the general role of government can be that of a facilitator of
labor-management cooperation. While it is clear that overall govern
ment policy, at the national level, seems decidedly neutral on the mat
ter of labor-management relations, government can facilitate
innovation and cooperation if it so desires.
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Second, it is clear that legalism and the law play but a small role in
these innovative, cooperative relationships. The parties do not assert
legal rights vis-a-vis each other (for example, the employer©s right to
withhold information), and they do not interact through the courts and
the NLRB. Rather, they negotiate and behave in a problem-solving
mode.
Third, it appears that the National Labor Relations Act has not been
a barrier to innovation and cooperation in nonunion firms. The corpora
tions discussed in this chapter have all created ways to involve their
employees without necessarily running afoul of the law.
Overall, then, the lesson seems to be that if management is truly
interested in treating its employees well and involving its employees in
the production process, the law does not prevent them from doing so.
Management makes the determination, and management has a choice.
The implications of this will be discussed in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER

Impairment of Workers© Rights
of Choice
The essence of the National Labor Relations Act is employee
choice. The basic rights in the Act are enumerated in Section 7, which
gives employees the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
and engage in concerted activity for mutual aid and protection and for
the purposes of collective bargaining; it also gives employees the right
to refrain from engaging in such activity. If employees choose union
representation for collective bargaining purposes, the Act requires the
employer to bargain with the union selected, in essence permitting the
manifestation of the right of self-organization.
Most of the National Labor Relations Act is designed to effectuate
this choice. The unfair labor practices in the NLRA are, to a large
extent, designed to prevent infringements on worker choice by employ
ers and by unions. Section 8(a)(l), a general prohibition on employers,
prevents employer restraint, interference, and coercion with this right.
Sections 8(a)(2) through 8(a)(5) constitute prohibitions on specific
employer activity that Congress believed impaired the right of employ
ees to choose. Section 8(a)(2) prevents employer domination of or
assistance to a labor organization, as Congress believed that employees
should not be required to consider an organization that was not inde
pendent of the employer. 1 Section 8(a)(3) prevents employer discrimi
nation in terms or conditions of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in a labor organization. Section 8(a)(4) pre
vents employer discrimination for giving testimony or filing charges
under the Act. Section 8(a)(5) requires the employer to bargain with
the union duly selected by the employees. Section 8(b)(l) of the Act
extends this prohibition on impairing employee choice to unions, pre-
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venting them from restraining or coercing employees in their rights
under Section 7.
Article 10 creates a full enforcement mechanism for these (and the
other) unfair labor practices under the Act. It gives the NLRB the right
to take evidence, subpoena witnesses, and issue appropriate orders.
Courts of appeals are involved, either through an NLRB enforcement
order or through an appeal by a party "aggrieved" by an NLRB order.
Parties may, in turn, request Supreme Court review of court of appeals
decisions.
Section 9 implements the notion of choice by authorizing the NLRB
to conduct a representation election to determine whether an appropri
ate unit of employees wish to be represented for collective purposes.
The Board will conduct such an election once there is a "showing of
substantial interest" when at least 30 percent of the employees in an
appropriate unit have signed cards authorizing a union to represent
them or have otherwise demonstrated that they wish to be represented
by a union. The Board also has the authority to determine an appropri
ate unit, i.e., which employees have a sufficient "community of inter
est" to be included together in a rational bargaining unit. This Board
authority facilitates the employee choice process by not limiting the
choice process to all employees in particular facility or location.
Smaller but occupationally or economically rational groups of employ
ees may also make that choice.2

The Legal Situation
Observations on the Choice Process

A key component of the choice mechanism is the NLRB representa
tion election campaign. Upon a finding of substantial interest, the
Board will attempt to schedule an election to be held within thirty
days. With questions often being raised about the composition of the
bargaining unit and other such matters, 80 percent of all elections are
held within three months of the representation petition. 3 During this
period between petition and election, a campaign is conducted, during
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which the employer and the union each present their views on the mat
ter of unionization of the unit.
As noted in chapter 2, the law of union organizing, based on princi
ples of free speech and property rights, has evolved over the last forty
years so as to provide employers with a great deal of freedom to
present their point of view at the workplace as long as they do not
explicitly threaten, restrain, or coerce employees. This includes the
right to require employees, individually or in groups, to listen to the
employer©s point of view on union matters. On the other hand, also
based on principles of property rights, the law permits employers to
generally bar unions from their property, and to limit employee cam
paigning for the union to break periods and lunch periods. Unions, for
their part, are generally limited to literature distribution on the nearest
public property, home visits, telephone calls, and voluntary meetings
(Block and Wolkinson 1986; Block, Wolkinson, and Kuhn 1988).
Given such rights, an employer who is so inclined has the capability
and the right to campaign against the union daily and constantly during
the election campaign, exposing the employees to its point of view as
much as it wishes and in whatever forums it wishes. In other words, the
workplace is not a neutral forum where the costs and benefits of union
ization are discussed openly and freely.4 Rather, because of the nature
of employer property rights, the workplace is a location where one
point of view the employer©s is presented almost exclusively. As
the workplace is the only opportunity for all employees to gather
together and discuss unionism, the result is that the employer has a
near monopoly on access to employees during the election campaign.
Although the unfair labor practices in the Act are designed to pre
vent employers from interfering with employee rights of self-organiza
tion, the procedures under the NLRA for resolving disputes over the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit permit employers who are so
inclined to delay the election and extend the campaign, permitting
them to further benefit from their access advantage among employees.
In addition, the nonpunitive remedial philosophy in the NLRA
allows employers to aggressively explore their rights under the Act to
oppose unionization. Because the property rights of employers permit
them to take action and maintain that action pending a final disposition
of the case, including exhaustion of all appeals, employees who have
been the victims of an alleged unfair labor practice must bear the bur-
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den of the delay resulting from the time it takes to process the case and
the appeals.5
Even if the employer is ultimately found to have committed an
unfair labor practice, it must only reinstate the employee with back pay
less interim earnings. There are no additional punitive damages
assessed. In other words, the employer is not "punished" for its viola
tion, thereby lessening the cost of violating the NLRA as compared to
what the cost would be with a punitive remedial system. 6
Employees of an employer who aggressively opposes unionization
may be reluctant to openly support unionization for fear of being dis
charged and having to undergo a long and somewhat uncertain legal
process without employment. In addition, such a concern could dis
courage other employees from supporting unionization. In this way, the
right of employees to choose unionization could be impaired.
When Employees Select a Union

Where employees select a union to represent them, after all chal
lenges and objections to the election are resolved, the union is "certi
fied" as the representative of the employees. At that time, the question
of representation is considered settled for one year. The Board will not
accept a decertification petition nor any employer claim that it doubts
the union©s majority status. The purpose of this one-year hiatus in rais
ing the representation question is to give the parties the opportunity to
establish a collective bargaining relationship.
It is the legal obligation of the employer to bargain in good faith
with the union. This is a straightforward extension of the choice princi
ple if employees select representation, the employer has a legal obli
gation to honor that choice. Although both parties must bargain in good
faith, neither side is required to agree to anything. In the event the
employer is found in violation of the Act, the absence of Board author
ity to impose terms and conditions of employment means that it can
only issue a cease-and-desist order, essentially directing the employer
to do what it should have done originally bargain. Moreover, such an
order may not be final until after all appeals are exhausted, which may
take up to two years. Again, the employees must bear the burden of the
employer©s appeals.7
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Finally, both sides may engage in self-help in the event there is no
agreement on a contract. The employees, through their union, may
strike, and the employer may lock out the employees. The employer©s
right to self-help also extends to permanently replacing the strikers, if
it so desires.8
When a Union is Not Selected

When a union is not selected and all objections and challenges are
resolved, as is the case when the union is selected, another election
cannot be held for another year. The principle is that the employees and
the employer should be relieved of the pressure of an organizing cam
paign. During that period, although the employees may continue to
support the union, the union may not picket the employer for recogni
tion or organization.
Summary

The foregoing is a brief overview of the law covering employee
choice of whether or not to be represented collectively by a union. How
have these rights been effectuated in practice? The next section will use
the testimony at the Dunlop Commission hearings to demonstrate how
employee rights are affected by the exercise of employer rights to resist
unionization.

Employer Behavior and Employee Choice

As discussed in chapter 2 and in the previous section of this chapter,
the principle of employee freedom of choice of collective or individual
representation is at the heart of the National Labor Relations Act. The
Dunlop Commission heard a great deal of testimony from employees
and union representatives suggesting that the choice mechanism can be
distorted by employers who are so inclined.
The purpose of this section of the chapter is to use the testimony
before the Dunlop Commission to illustrate how the National Labor
Relations Act, which was enacted to protect employee choice in repre
sentation, can be used to actually impair employee choice. The mate-
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rial in this section of the chapter was taken directly from the transcripts
of the Commission hearings. Although we had no reason to disbelieve
what was said before the Commission, we believed it was necessary to
obtain some independent corroboration of the statements where possi
ble, given the statements that were made regarding employer behavior.
Thus, in all cases in which the testimony indicated that the employer
had been found by the NLRB to have committed an unfair labor prac
tice, we found the case in the reporting services. For all cases that were
located, it was found that the employee or the union representative had
testified accurately about the charge, the facts, and the outcome. 9 This
gave us sufficient confidence in the veracity of the testimony to use it in
this chapter.
Given our decision to use the testimony, we decided to omit all iden
tifiers, despite the fact that in all cases except one, the individuals who
testified provided their names and identified the company involved. We
have omitted the names of the employers because the purpose of this
volume is not to criticize or accuse individual companies of wrongdo
ing. Rather, our purpose is to demonstrate a systemic problem under
our laws to show that any employer so inclined has the ability to
behave in this way. The names of the employees were omitted because
we were concerned about their employers being able to identify them.
This section of the chapter is divided into two subsections. The first
addresses impairment of employee choice during the organizing and
election process; the second addresses impairment of the employees©
right to bargain collectively after they have made the choice to be rep
resented by a union.
Employer Behavior vis-a-vis Employee Attempts at Organization
The control the employer has over the workplace and the makewhole (nonpunitive) principle of the remedial structure of the NLRA
provide an incentive for employers who are so inclined to operate on
the margin of the law. Penalties are mild and the benefits, in terms of
discouraging employees from selecting union representation, can be
substantial. The law provides employers a great deal of leeway in cam
paigning against unionization. The low cost of remedies can serve to
encourage employers who are so inclined to push their behavior to the
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outer edges of the law, knowing that the cost of falling over the edge is
minimal.
Given this incentive structure in the Act, it is not surprising that
some employers are extremely aggressive in resisting unionization.
One women testified that she was fired by her employer, a large retail
organization in New England, on the day after Thanksgiving, 1993. 10
The employee testified that prior to her discharge, her employer
engaged in such activities as having her followed by security guards
with walkie talkies when she went to restaurants on her day off, assign
ing a management person to watch her eight hours per day while at
work, and timing her while she went to the restroom. She testified that
it was "harassment beyond what I could ever tell you. Unless you have
lived through it, you couldn©t know what it feels like." 11
An official of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
(ACTWU) and an employee testified about a firm that manufactures
plastic components. 12 It employs approximately fifty people. Accord
ing to the testimony, in 1993, some employees contacted the ACTWU
about representation. In May 1993, the ACTWU had obtained authori
zation card signatures of thirty-three employees of a unit of forty-five.
On May 25, the ACTWU petitioned for a representation election,
which was eventually set for late July. The ACTWU official testified
that after the election was set, the company began an antiunion cam
paign. The company©s legal representatives were on site constantly.
The company delivered captive audience speeches, 13 both departmentwide and individually. Employees to whom management had never
previously spoken were all contacted individually by the company in
an attempt to change their minds about the union. The union still won
the election by one vote.
The company, however, challenged the results of the election. There
was a hearing on the challenge in September 1993, and the results were
upheld in November 1993. On the day before Thanksgiving, however,
the company discharged the employee who testified at the hearing.
A third firm was the subject of testimony from an ACTWU vicepresident and an ACTWU organizer. 14 According to the testimony of
these two individuals, the ACTWU was involved in an organizing cam
paign among 600 workers in a hosiery plant in a southern state. The
company delivered captive audience speeches, made threats to close
the plant, and took an amount of money equal to one year of dues from
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one paycheck. The company permitted an antiunion committee to have
the run of the plant during working hours, while union supporters were
required to stay on the job. The company organized the local bankers,
while the union received support from local ministers.
Initially, 81 percent of the employees signed authorization cards. In
an election held on July 22, 1993, the employees chose representation
by a vote of 270-237. The company objected to the election. In January
1994, the NLRB dismissed the company©s objections. While the objec
tion proceedings were ongoing, three union supporters were dis
charged.
The same ACTWU official and a former employee described the sit
uation at a textile manufacturer in the South. 15 In April and May of
1990, the workers overwhelmingly signed ACTWU authorization
cards, and a union election was scheduled. The company immediately
discharged the employee and her husband. The employee believed the
purpose of the discharge was to frighten other workers, an effective
tactic as there are few jobs in the small town in which the plant is
located.
The union lost the election but filed unfair labor practice charges.
The Board ultimately found the employer in violation of the Act, but
the decision was not affirmed by the court of appeals until January
1993.
The NLRB ordered a new election to be held in April of 1993. In
addition, the employee and her husband were reinstated with back pay.
As of January 1994, however, they had not received their back pay.
Meanwhile, another worker was discharged, and the employee and her
husband were discharged for a second time in August 1993. She testi
fied that the company had told the employees that they had no right to
have a union at that firm. Her husband testified that the employees
were told that the only right the employees had was "to go out the
door."
A fifth firm was described by the organizing director of the Indus
trial Union Department of the AFL-CIO and a former employee of that
firm. 16 The employee testified that she worked at the firm until Septem
ber 29, 1993, when she was discharged. Discussions about unioniza
tion had begun in July 1993 and she was actively in favor of the union.
She claimed that the company tried to intimidate employees by show
ing antiunion films and distributing antiunion pamphlets. She testified
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that "scare tactics" were used every day, as supervisors asked people
how they were voting in the upcoming representation election.
The company initiated roundtable discussions at which only people
opposed to unionization were allowed to speak. The employees were
told that if the union won, the plant would close. The company had the
president of the local Chamber of Commerce, school teachers, and a
local minister speak to the employees. The testifying employee
claimed her termination occurred when she received permission to go
home because she felt sick in the morning; the company claimed she
had walked out. She voted in the election, and the union needed that
vote to win. The company objected to the election. Meanwhile, the
NLRB issued a complaint on the employee©s behalf. 17
An international representative of the United Auto Workers and an
employee testified about the situation in a supplier for the cosmetics
industry located in the northeast. 18 In December 1992, the UAW repre
sentative had a meeting with a group of employees from the firm. On
January 25, 1993, five employees signed authorization cards and
became an organizing committee. The employees and the UAW repre
sentative began leafletting on February 3, 1993. During February, the
union obtained authorization from sixty-two employees. According to
the UAW representative, the labor law violations began on February 9,
when a supervisor distributed a leaflet threatening the employees with
loss of employment if they selected a union.
A consultant brought in by the company formed Spokespersons, an
in-plant committee. The company posted notices for an election for
Spokesperson officers and supervised the election on company time.
The company discussed with Spokespersons such items as wages, ben
efits, and breaks.
On March 3, 1993, the UAW held a meeting. In attendance were
three UAW in-plant organizing committee members. These three
employees distributed union literature at the gates prior to start of shift
and on breaks. After this distribution, the consultant threatened to close
the plant. The consultant also informed employees that the company
could say "no, no" in bargaining, and that selecting the union would be
futile. The company also promised benefits, interrogated employees,
and disciplined two union supporters.
On March 2, March 11, and March 17, the company warned, sus
pended, and again warned one of the in-plant committee members.
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Also in March, the company prohibited employees from talking about
unions on their facilities. On April 29, the company fired one
employee, and on June 4, the company discharged two more union
supporters.
One employee testified that his girlfriend had been fired. She has
been out of work since April 1993. (The hearing at which the employee
testified was held in January of 1994). The company has threatened to
move, and they have instilled fear.
Based upon charges filed by the union, fourteen complaints were
issued on August 4, 1993. As of January 5, 1994, the case was still
awaiting a hearing.
Finally, there was much testimony about the situation in the health
care sector in a large city in a border state. 19 One person who testified, a
registered nurse representing an affiliate of the American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, was involved in an organiz
ing campaign at a large hospital (Hospital 1). She stated that two
prounion nurses were "blacklisted" by hospitals in the city. One of the
nurses was denied transfer to that hospital from a second hospital
(Hospital 2). Instead, the position, one of two at Hospital 2, was
awarded to a less-experienced, less-qualified nurse. It was also testified
that two charge nurses at Hospital 1 who were union activists were
removed from their positions and forced to reapply for those positions.
One of the charge nurses who had fourteen years with the hospital was
replaced by someone with only one year with the hospital.
Another registered nurse testified that she graduated from the local
university in 1988 with a BS in Nursing. In June 1988, she was hired at
Hospital 1. She became active in trying to organize a union, obtaining
authorization card signatures of a majority of nurses in her unit. She
was featured with other union leaders in a newspaper article.
In August 1989, she and a friend resigned their positions with Hos
pital 1 due to understaffing. There was a local nursing shortage at the
time, and all local hospitals were trying to recruit nurses. They applied
to a third hospital (Hospital 3), were interviewed, and told to report for
work in the transitional care unit (TCU) at Hospital 3 on September 25,
1989.
On September 20, she and her friend received letters informing them
that there was no position of employment for them at Hospital 3. In
order to investigate the matter, another nurse who did not otherwise
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identify herself called Hospital 3 and inquired about a position in TCU
at Hospital 3. It was testified that the nurse who called was told that the
hospital had such positions. It was also testified that Hospital 3 had
placed an advertisement in the newspaper of September 26, 1989 stat
ing that it had positions in TCU.
The employee who claimed she was blacklisted testified that while
she was at Hospital 1, she had excellent evaluations. Her overall aver
age evaluations were 3.6, where 3.0 is satisfactory and 4.0 is excellent.
She testified that she had a 5.0 in one area. She believes she was black
listed for her union activity, and that this blacklisting created fear. She
is now working as a nurse at a less satisfactory job.
Another person who testified worked in employee relations with the
group that controlled two of the hospitals. His dates of employment
were January 1989 to August 1992, at which time he was laid off. This
person transferred into employee relations at Hospital 1 when it was
facing a serious organizing campaign. He testified that the controlling
organization was "vehemently antiunion" and that 80 percent of the
time in employee relations was spent on antiunion activity. He testified
that the organization was not concerned about the NLRB, and he had
heard senior managers brag about their ability to defeat unions through
illegal action. He said that the company collected personal information,
correct or not, in order to prevent unionization that the information
could be used against somebody, or could be used to determine how
they might vote in an organizing campaign. Moreover, this information
was shared with other hospitals inside and outside the chain. He testi
fied that he was in the office when the personnel director of Hospital 1
recommended to the personnel director of Hospital 3 that the employee
and her friend not be hired.
An international representative from the ACTWU and two dis
charged workers testified about a foreign-owned firm based in Ohio. 20
One of the employees who testified was a member of a group that met
with the ACTWU international representative and then told their super
visor they intended to organize a union. Soon after they informed their
supervisor of this, all five employees were discharged for falsifying
time sheets, despite the fact that the activity for which they were fired
had been going on for years. The company also made personal attacks
on the five discharged employees, spreading false claims that one was
an alcoholic and that another was sexually harassing women. The
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workers were discharged on December 15, 1992, and charges were
filed with the NLRB on December 17. A complaint was issued on Feb
ruary 27, 1993, and a hearing date was set for July 27 of that year. In
March, the company asked for a postponement until August, and its
request was granted. As of October 1993, the case had not been
decided.
Meanwhile, the union obtained the signatures of a majority of the
employees and petitioned for an election; an election was set for Feb
ruary 1993. The employer used captive audience speeches. The com
pany also held meetings from which union supporters were banned and
screened a film about an old strike involving the use of violence. The
company hung newspaper articles on the bulletin boards about closed
plants, pointing out that those could be pictures of their plant. They
said that bargaining would "start from scratch" and that the workers
could lose what they had. The campaigning went on every day for eight
hours per day, including two-on-one meetings with workers during the
last week of the campaign. Eventually, the union lost the election by a
vote of 25-16.
An officer of United Food and Commercial Workers Local 951
described the attempts of workers to organize at a food retailer.21 These
attempts began in 1987. According to the testimony, the employer used
professional management consultants. The union lost by a narrow mar
gin and filed unfair labor practice charges and postelection objections.
They stated that the employer put people in back rooms and questioned
them about their union propensities in the presence of supervisors; no
witnesses were present. The employer conducted surveillance of
employees in and away from the workplace. The employer promised
benefits if the union "went away" and threatened to close if it did not.
There were also threats to discontinue benefits and job protection.
Although the union prevailed in its charges, the Board proceedings
lasted two years. The NLRB was ultimately upheld in the court of
appeals, but no money had been paid to the employees as of October
13, 1993.
The president of Service Employees International Union Local 1199
described the situation at a nursing home owned by an organization
that operates nursing homes throughout the United States.22 An
employee was suspended for asking a question during a captive audi-
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ence speech, and a second worker was fired for accompanying the first
to the office on her own time, while the suspension was taking place.
An official of the Kentucky State AFL-CIO described an organizing
campaign at a meat processor in Kentucky. 23 In that case, the NLRB
finally certified the election two years after election was held; the mar
gin of victory was the votes of three illegally discharged employees.
The employer has stated it will appeal the case.
Analysis. It is not the purpose of this monograph to determine the
legality of these actions. Indeed, it is often difficult to distinguish
between those activities that are technically legal and those that cross
the line of illegality. That line is an extremely fine one.
What is clear is that even legal activities have the effect of infringing
on the employee©s right to choose. While it may be legal for several
management personnel to call a single employee into an office and
present to that employee the employer©s view on unionization, the
mere fact that an employee is in a room with several management per
sonnel in an adversarial situation is likely to cause an employee to fear
for his or her job if he/she chooses to vote against management©s pref
erence in a representation election.
A number of discharges associated with organizing campaigns were
cited, as were other kinds of lesser workplace actions that could be
construed as harassment for union activities. Whether those discharges
and these lesser workplace actions were in violation of the law is less
important than the fact that they seem to be an accepted method of
resisting unions. These employers must be aware that discharge and
discrimination in terms and conditions of employment for the purpose
of discouraging union activity is unlawful. In view of the fact that an
organizing campaign was in process when the discharges occurred, it is
reasonable to believe that the employer had to have considered the pos
sibility that its actions were unlawful. It appears they believed that the
benefits, in terms of discouragement of union activity were worth the
risk of a finding of a violation. Thus, it is clear that the law has done
nothing to discourage aggressive employer behavior that, at best, is on
the margin of legality, and at worst is illegal.
These situations result from the employer©s control of the work
place. In essence, the employer can act, and any attempt to prevent the
employer from acting as it wishes will meet with resistance through the
legal process.
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The delays in the processing of cases clearly injure employees.
While the legal process continues, the employee continues to suffer
without employment. In essence, the employer is able to shift to the
employee the burden of determining the legality of the employer©s
actions.
Employer Behavior in Collective Bargaining

In addition to the right of self-organization, the law places on the
employer the obligation to bargain with the union that the employees
have chosen to represent them, should the employees so choose. As
noted, the obligation to bargain with the employees© chosen represen
tative is a natural extension of the right of the employees to choose a
union to represent them. The right to select representation without a
commensurate obligation on the employer to recognize and bargain
with the union would make the right to choose a hollow right.
The law, however, also permits employers and unions to refuse to
agree to anything. Good faith bargaining, under the law, requires only
that the parties meet at reasonable times, consider issues relating to
terms and conditions of employment, and to be willing to sign a con
tract. On the other hand, it does not require the making of a concession.
At impasse, defined as the inability to come to agreement after good
faith bargaining, the parties may use their economic weapons. The
union may strike and the employer may implement its offer, lock the
employees out and utilize temporary replacements, or both. If the
union strikes, the employer may hire permanent replacements for the
strikers at the terms and conditions in the employer©s last proposal at
impasse, provided strikers are permitted to return at any time during
the strike if their jobs have not yet been filled.
Under the NLRA, then, reasoned bargaining, adherence to a posi
tion, the use of economic force, and self-help to offset the other party©s
of weapons are permitted. How this plays out in practice vis-a-vis the
rights of employees who have chosen representation can be determined
from Dunlop Commission testimony.
An official of Laborers Local 576 in Louisville and a former
employee testified about the situation regarding a supplier of packag
ing materials to appliance manufacturers. 24 The union lost its first elec
tion among the employees of the firm in 1991, and attributed the loss to
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a company promise of wage increases. At the time, the employees were
making $4.70 per hour. In a second election in November 1992, the
employees chose representation. In June 1993, half of the employees
struck after the company would not compromise on any proposal. The
company then replaced the striking workers, including the employee
who testified.25
An employee of a food processing firm in eastern Michigan testified
but declined to identify himself for fear of employer retribution. 26 The
employee was a member of the bargaining committee of a union certi
fied to represent the employees of the firm. Although the union won the
election in April 1992, it took an additional year for the union to be
certified. He said that the company does not wish to bargain, and that
they have withheld a wage increase. They came to the table only after
the union filed charges. He said the company would not discuss safety
issues, discharged people for being "discourteous" to supervisors,
refused to consider the union©s health care plan, and proposed an indef
inite extension of the probationary period. He said the union has con
ceded to "a lot," and the employees do not want to strike; they need
their jobs.
An official of the United Electrical Workers Union read a statement
of an employee of a firm at which the union represented the employ
ees.27 According to the statement, the union attempted to negotiate a
contract for fifteen months. The company, however, refused to recog
nize stewards for grievance handling purposes. Former union activists
were fired. The union went out on an unfair labor practice strike on
September 9, 1989. An unfair labor practice charge was filed, and in
January 1991, an administrative law judge recommended a finding of a
violation. The employees eventually went back to work in February
1991. In March, the union filed additional unfair labor practice charges
against the company for refusing to bargain, discharging additional
union-supporting employees, and illegally forcing workers to pay part
of dental benefits. In April 1992, there was an additional unfair labor
practice when the company unilaterally removed dental benefits. Fol
lowing this, the company required employees who wished dental cov
erage to come to the office and sign an agreement saying they would
agree not to file any labor board charges. Eventually, a court injunction
was issued against the employer. Although a new company attorney
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has agreed to recognize stewards, the employees were still without an
agreement as of January 1994.
A business representative of the International Brotherhood of Elec
trical Workers (IBEW) testified regarding a unit of IBEW-represented
employees working for private contractors at an Air Force satellite sta
tion on the West Coast.28 There were fifty-two employees in the bar
gaining unit, most of whom had been employed there for years. The
various companies who had received the contract had always been
unionized. In early 1992, a new firm obtained the Air Force contract
and aggressively asserted management prerogatives. During that eigh
teen-month period, the firm lost fifteen arbitration cases heard under
the existing collective agreement. In August 1993, negotiations opened
for a new contract. The company came to the table with fifty-two pro
posals while the union had only nine. At the beginning of negotiations,
the company said the union must accept seven proposals before any
others could be discussed, and these proposals called for reductions in
benefits. At the expiration of the contract on October 1, the company
implemented all fifty-two proposals. The employees kept working and
filed charges with the NLRB. The union requested mediation but the
company refused. The union struck on October 11, 1993. On October
12, the company replaced all the workers. As all of the workers needed
new security clearances, these costs were borne by the public. The
union pointed out that the company was determined not to have vio
lated the law by its actions.
Analysis. The foregoing cases indicate the impact of the NLRA phi
losophy of noninvolvement in the substance of bargaining. In theory,
such a principle makes sense; one does not wish the government telling
the parties to collective bargaining what to include in their collective
agreements.
The noninvolvement principle does not operate in a vacuum, how
ever. Rather, it can be combined with the property rights of the
employer and the use of legal procedures under the NLRA to actually
discourage true bargaining from occurring. Behaviors that can be used
in organizing to discourage unionism can also be used to avoid coming
to an agreement, with a result that the employee choice to bargain is
frustrated after, rather than before, the choice is made.
Employers who are so inclined can behave like the Air Force con
tractor, which followed a very straightforward and simple strategy in
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eliminating the union. First, the employer presents the union with pro
posals that it knows are unacceptable to it. As the government will not
become involved in the substance of proposals, this is not unlawful.
Second, the employer continues to meet at appropriate times. This sat
isfies an important legal requirement. Third, the employer refuses to
compromise. This is legal, as the law does not require either party to
agree to anything or to make a concession.
At this point, the union usually chooses one of two options. It may
strike and risk replacement, or it may sign a contract it deems unac
ceptable. Either way the employer©s strategy has been a success. In this
scenario, the employer has acted perfectly legally, but the union©s
power is removed either under the threat of the company hiring
replacements or by the company carrying out that threat.

Conclusions
The NLRA, as amended and interpreted, permits behavior such as
was described in this chapter to occur at U.S. workplaces. The use of
legalism by employers, and the persistent exercise of procedural rights
to object to an election, to go to a hearing, or to appeal the decision of
an administrative law judge or the NLRB also have the effect of pre
venting employees from exercising their right to choose under the Act.
While there is no contention in this volume that all employers use
the law in this way, there is no doubt that the law can be used in this
way, and some employers take advantage of the law to the detriment of
their employees© rights. In this sense, we are aware that this chapter
may not present a complete picture of union organizing. These may
represent extreme examples; the majority of organizing campaigns
may not be associated with such behavior. But the fact that such behav
ior can and does occur is, in our judgement, sufficient to take notice. If
behavior is undesirable, it does not become less so because only a
minority of persons engage in it.
One point seems particularly relevant. Although the employer may
act legally, the result of pyramiding legal activities one on top of
another is an outcome that was surely not intended by the Act. The
NLRA was enacted to provide employees with a free and uncoerced
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choice regarding whether to be represented by a union and to provide
the employees in a unit in which a union was chosen the right to bar
gain collectively. The law can be used, however, to achieve precisely
the opposite result.
Two examples will illustrate the point. The employer may exercise
its legal rights under the NLRA to speak to employees about unioniza
tion, its control over its employees© time to require the employees to
hear the employer©s message during working hours, its control over its
employees© time to limit the employees© ability to discuss unionization
during working hours, and, its control over its property to prevent the
union from entering the property. While the exercise of each of these
rights may be justifiable by themselves, taken together they result in a
substantial imbalance in favor of the employer in the ability of the
employee to receive information about unionization. Moreover, taken
together, they provide a demonstration of the employer©s power over
the employee, making the choice of unionization appear much more
costly to the employees than it might otherwise be perceived.
A second example is in the bargaining context. An employer, by
exercising a legal right to make a proposal that is unacceptable to the
union and its legal right to refuse to make a concession, and by point
ing out its option to replace striking workers, can place the union in a
position in which it must accept what the employer proposes or strike
and risk replacement. In the first instance, the employees choice to bar
gain collectively has been frustrated because no true "give-and-take"
bargaining has occurred. In the second instance, employees have lost
their jobs because they chose to unionize and bargain collectively.
Unfortunately, the Board seems to have no vehicle for making a
finding of an unfair labor practice based on the results of a series of
otherwise lawful acts. Under our legal system, each allegation is exam
ined discretely, and a decision is made based on that allegation.
Although there is a long-established doctrine under the NLRA under
which the Board can examine the "totality of conduct" on the part of
the employer to establish "hostile motive" for alleged discrimination to
discourage union membership, this doctrine is triggered only when
there is an allegation of an illegal action.
A second issue is the ability of the employer to use its procedural
rights to resist unionization. The employer may exercise its due process
rights to appeal adverse Board rulings, and then exercise its manage-
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ment and property rights to require employees to bear the burden of the
delay associated with the employer©s exercise of its due process rights,
possibly through a lost job or an inability to obtain a contract.
The implications of this will be discussed in the concluding chapter.
NOTES
1. It has been argued that this provision impairs employers© ability to create employee partici
pation structures where no union exists.
2. A greater appreciation of the principle of unit determination can be obtained by examining
the wording of Section 9(b):
The Board shall decide in each case whether in order to assure to employees the
fullest freedom of association in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer
unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof.
3. See, for example, Roomkin and Block (1981).
4. Although the benefits and costs of unionization for any particular group of employees can
not be fully discussed here, a short summary might be useful. In general, union representation
means that employees may not negotiate with their employer individually for terms and condi
tions of employment that differ from those bargained for the entire unit. The major benefits of
unionization lie in the hope that a union will be able to obtain better terms and conditions of
employment, on average, by negotiating collectively than the employee will be able to obtain indi
vidually and to create objective, enforceable standards for employer decision making vis-a-vis
employees.
5. An item in the "Work Week" column of The Wall Street Journal for November 15, 1994
(page 1) will illustrate the point. The item is quoted in full:
Ten years after charges of unfair labor practices, workers collect $16 million.
Donald Griffin, 47, was president of Allied Industrial Workers Local 879 in 1984
when U.S. Marine Co. bought a Hartford, Wis. boat engine factory from Chrysler
Corp. and clashed with the union. Today, former coworkers give him much of the
credit for the back pay settlement due 620 workers from U.S. Marine©s successor,
Brunswick Corp.
Mr. Griffin says 17 of the 262 workers who originally started the case are dead. Of
the 34 workers who the National Labor Relations Board says weren©t rehired for
antiunion reasons, two lost their homes because they couldn©t meet the mortgage
payments. Mr. Griffin, who pursued the case from his basement during off hours,
says the stress played a part in the breakup of his first marriage. With seemingly
endless appeals, it became a test of "who can hold out the longest."
Brunswick says the case could have gone on to the year 2000, and it made a "busi
ness decision" to settle now (italics in original).
6. Kleiner has argued that the sanctions against employers for violating the NLRA are not suf
ficient to deter employers who are so inclined from violating the Act. Put differently, Kleiner
found that the benefits, in terms of lower costs of operation without a union and the increased
probability of preventing unionization far outweigh any costs associated with the remedial struc
ture of the Act. The conclusion then, was that the incentive structure in the law encouraged viola
tions of the law. See Kleiner (1984, 1994).
7. For the legal doctrine, see, for example, U.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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8. For the governing legal doctrine, see, for example, NLRB v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph
Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938); NLRB v. Insurance Agents International Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960);
and American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
9. All cases were found in the Labor Relations Reference Manual published by the Bureau of
National Affairs. LRRM is available at the Labor and Industrial Relations Library at Michigan
State University and at most law libraries in the United States. Cites for these cases have been
omitted to protect the names of these firms from being widely disseminated. The cites are avail
able from the authors upon request.
10. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, Boston, Massachusetts, January 5, 1994, pp. 66, 195-97.
11. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, Boston, Massachusetts, January 5, 1994, p. 196.
12. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, Boston, Massachusetts, January 5, 1994, pp. 161-67.
13. A "captive audience" speech is delivered when the employer directs one or more employ
ees to hear the employer©s message. The employees do not have the option of leaving the room or
otherwise not listening to the message. For an employee to decline to expose him- or herself to the
message would be insubordination.
14. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, Atlanta, Georgia, January 11, 1994, pp. 149-55.
15. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, Atlanta, Georgia, January 11, 1994, pp. 1588-62.
16. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, Atlanta, Georgia, January 11, 1994, pp. 130-35.
17. Under Board procedure, its regional office, on behalf of the Board©s General Counsel,
issues a "complaint," when, after investigation of a charge, it has reasonable cause to believe a
violation of the NLRA occurred.
18. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, Boston, Massachusetts, January 5, 1994, pp. 138-52.
19. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, Louisville, Kentucky, September 22, 1993, pp. 229-44.
20. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, East Lansing, Michigan, October 13, 1993, pp. 158-69.
21. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, East Lansing, Michigan, October 13, 1993, pp. 170-76. See also 300 N.L.R.B. 649, 136
LRRM 1212 (1990).
22. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, East Lansing, Michigan, October 13, 1993, pp. 187-94. A quote from the Board decision in
the case is instructive:
This consolidated case concerns violations which occurred primarily during a 2year period from the summer of 1986 through the spring of 1988. During that
period the (firm) committed some 135 unfair labor practices at 32 of the 35 facili
ties here at issue. . . .
We find . . . that the (firm) has demonstrated a proclivity to violate the act.... (cite
available on request
23. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, Louisville, Kentucky, September 22, 1993, pp. 212-15. See also 145 LRRM 1144 (August
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10, 1993), 145 LRRM 1280 (January 31, 1994). The latter decision was reported by the BNA as
follows:
... the employer was found to have violated (the NLRA) by refusing to bargain
with a newly certified union. In a ruling on a motion for summary judgement, the
NLRB found that all representation issues raises were, or could have been, liti
gated in a prior representation proceeding, that the employer did not offer a newly
discovered, previously unavailable evidence, and that it did not show any special
circumstances required the board to reexamine the decision made in the represen
tation proceeding (145 LRRM at 1280).
24. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, Louisville, Kentucky, October 22, 1993, pp. 253-59.
25. The charge of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations excluded
matters involving the permanent replacement of economic strikers because a bill prohibiting per
manent replacements was being considered in Congress at the time of the hearings. Thus, the
Commission did not seek such testimony, and there was very little such testimony at the hearings.
Some testimony on permanent replacements was occasionally offered, however, at the initiative of
those appearing before the Commission, in the context of other matters within the charge of the
Commission.
26. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, East Lansing, Michigan, October 13, 1994, pp. 181-87.
21 .Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, Boston, Massachusetts, January 5, 1994, pp. 88-97. See also 142 LRRM 1308 (September
30, 1992), 143 LRRM 1204 (December 16, 1992).
28. Transcript of the Hearing of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Rela
tions, San Jose, California, January 27, 1994, pp. 330-35.

CHAPTER

Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this volume has been to use the testimony before the
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations to gain
insight into the state of industrial relations and labor law in the United
States in the mid-1990s. To that end, chapter 2 explored in some detail
the evolution of labor law since 1935, changes in industrial relations
practice associated with that evolution, and changes in the economic
environment. Both the unionized and the emergent nonunion systems
were analyzed. The lesson from chapter 2 was that the essence of the
National Labor Relations Act is employee choice in the matter of union
representation. Labor law was designed to create a system by which
employees could exercise a choice to select, or to reject, union repre
sentation. If the employees chose union representation, the law was
designed to provide them with the fruits of that choice by obligating
the employer to negotiate with their chosen representative.
This ideal, however, is not always met. Because U.S. labor policy is
based on the principle of governmental noninvolvement in the bargain
ing process, and because of the characteristics of processing and decid
ing both representation and unfair labor practice cases under the
NLRA, our industrial relations system manifests wide variation in the
extent to which the principle of employee choice is honored in actual
practice.
Chapter 3 provided examples of firms that respect the right of
employee choice. Unionized firms profiled in that chapter engaged in
extensive cooperation and innovative relationships with the unions rep
resenting their employees, often bringing in the union as a partner in
making important decisions. On occasion, such a relationship was
facilitated by governmental structures. For example, the governmental
agencies in the metropolitan area around Louisville, Kentucky sup-
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ported labor-management cooperation. Bargaining relationships that
have benefited include those between Philip Morris and the Bakery,
Confectionery, and Tobacco Workers Union, and between Louisville
Gas and Electric and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Work
ers.
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has also been
active in encouraging parties to improve their relationships, expanding
its role beyond the traditional one of helping to resolve labor disputes.
The result is that disputes are avoided. Examples of relationships that
have benefited from FMCS involvement are that between Reynolds
Metals Corporation and the International Association of Machinists
and between Healthspan Corporation (of Minneapolis/St. Paul) and the
Service Employees International Union.
A key to respecting employee choice under the National Labor
Relations Act appears to be the willingness of the parties to avoid
legalism, to minimize insistence on exploring and exercising legal
rights vis-a-vis the other party. The parties in innovative and coopera
tive relationships such as those highlighted in chapter 3 directly inter
act with each other based on their respective interests. They negotiate a
resolution of their problems on a face-to-face basis, as issues arise.
They eschew an adversarial relationship through the NLRB and the
courts. Examples of this type of relationship are the Ford Motor Com
pany and the United Auto Workers, New United Manufacturing Com
pany and the UAW, Miller Brewing and the UAW, and National Steel
and the United Steelworkers of America.
As labor law in the United States is designed to provide employees
with a choice regarding whether they wish a union to represent them, it
is not surprising that many employees are not represented by a union.
Indeed, a major phenomenon in industrial relations in the last quarter
century has been the development of employee relations systems for
nonunion employees. Many nonunion or partially unionized firms have
adopted employee relations practices that create objective or meritbased systems for making decisions regarding employee relations
issues. Such firms often view their employees as assets to be utilized
rather than as costs to be minimized. These firms often create programs
that encourage employee involvement in the production process.
Examples of such firms include Texas Instruments, Coca-Cola, Delta
Airlines, Herman Miller, and Donnelly Corporation.
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Although the employees in such firms have not necessarily ever
made an explicit choice against union representation, there is no reason
to believe that there is a broad-based desire on the part of employees in
these firms for collective bargaining. Such firms develop strong
employment relations systems so that the matter of alternative
employee choices is seldom an issue. Broad-based employee disinter
est in unionism and the absence of widespread employee quitting sug
gests that, while these employees have not made an explicit choice
against union representation, it is likely that they would decline such
representation if asked. This, in essence, is a form of employee choice
against union representation, and it is perfectly legal and proper. The
only other policy option is to assert that employers may not voluntarily
treat their employees well, because to do so denies the employees the
opportunity to choose. This, it seems, is an untenable position to take.
By comparison, other firms avoid unionization by striking fear
among employees who attempt to unionize. Such firms use aspects of
the legal process to overtly resist the unionization of their employees.
They use the right to object to the proposed bargaining unit and to
refuse to agree to other stipulations to gain time to campaign against
union representation. They may threaten, coerce, or even discharge
employees, knowing that the penalties for such illegal behavior can be
delayed for months, through appeals of NLRB decisions. Moreover,
the remedies, when and if imposed, are weak. Indeed, it is likely that
the cost of an unfair labor practice is far less than the cost of a union,
suggesting a system that encourages labor law violations rather than
labor law compliance.
If the employees ultimately choose representation, the legal system
permits employers to resist the choice by creating an incentive to
refuse to bargain collectively, knowing that the only remedy available
to the Board is a cease-and-desist order. The use of self-help, combined
with governmental noninvolvement in the bargaining process, permits
an employer to maintain a position that is unacceptable to the union,
knowing that the union must risk permanent replacement of its mem
bers if it strikes. Should permanent replacement occur, an attempt to
decertify the union is the final step. In essence, the pyramiding of legal
rights gives the employer the means to legally rid itself of a union cho
sen by the employees, a result that was surely not contemplated by the
drafters of the National Labor Relations Act.
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It is outside the scope of this volume to present policy recommenda
tions. The final report of the Commission on the Future of WorkerManagement Relations has advocated some changes in the nation©s
labor laws. 1 Such recommendations have been made in other places as
well.2
What is clear from the hearings, however, is that labor law in the
United States permits great variation in the extent to which employers
respect the mechanism by which workers make a choice for or against
union representation and the rights of employees who choose union
representation to have that choice honored. While some employers
honor that choice, other employers do not. While the law applauds the
former, it cannot seem to prevent the latter. Ironically, then, a system
that was designed to provide a choice of representation to employees
seems only to provide employers with a choice a choice as to the type
of employee relations system they will create.
Such a system, we submit, must be changed. It is our view that the
law should reaffirm the rights of employees to make a choice for or
against union representation, and changes to the election and bargain
ing process are needed to facilitate the choice. While employers should
be able to participate in that process, the law should provide for the
involvement of the union in that process as well, so that employees
hear both views with equal clarity. The labor law remedial structure
should be closely examined to insure that law-abiding employers do
not perceive themselves as being placed at a competitive disadvantage
by their counterparts who may wish to engage in legal brinkmanship.
The law should explicitly state a preference for employee relations to
be administered through cooperation rather than through conflict.
A final issue is the matter of the pyramiding of legal rights to create
a result that, while not illegal, is clearly inconsistent with the principles
of the National Labor Relations Act. Thus, an important policy impli
cation is the need to empower the Board to address conduct which,
while not illegal in any of the particulars, has the overall effect of inter
fering with employee choice.
While there are certainly numerous policy suggestions that can be
made, perhaps the best answer was given by Peter Pestillo of Ford,
who pointed out that the law plays but a negligible role in the relation
ship between Ford and the UAW. This suggests that the labor law that
works best may be the law that is invoked the least, that creates a sys-
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tern to encourage the parties to resolve their disputes through respect
for employee choice. The hearings and this volume have illustrated the
costs of failure to honor employee choice through overreliance on the
law. Thus, the best answer may be less reliance on the law and legal
processes.
What is clear is that many employers and employees have been sup
ported by cooperative systems, and that many employees have been
hurt by conflict and the failure to recognize the legitimacy of employee
rights to choose. A full recognition of the benefits of respecting
employee choice, and the costs of impairing it, is the first step toward
change.
NOTES
1. See Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and Recommen
dations (1994).
2. See, for example, most recently, Gould (1993); and Friedman, Kurd, Oswald, and Seeber
(1994).
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